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I. INTRODUCTION
Concern about "political correctness" in higher education is not a new
phenomenon. In an especially candid letter to James Madison in 1826,
Thomas Jefferson outlined his criteria for the appointment of a law pro-
fessor at the University of Virginia:
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In the selection of our Law Professor, we must be rigorously attentive to his
political principles. You will recollect that before the revolution, Coke Lit-
tleton was the universal elementary book of law students, and a sounder
whig never wrote, nor of profounder learning in the orthodox doctrines of
the British constitution, or in what were called English liberties. You re-
member also that our lawyers were then all whigs. But when his black-
letter text, and uncouth but cunning learning got out of fashion, and the
honeyed Mansfieldism of Blackstone became the student's hornbook, from
that moment, that profession (the nursery of our Congress) began to slide
into toryism, and nearly all the young brood of lawyers now are of that hue.
They suppose themselves, indeed, to be whigs, because they no longer know
what whigism or republicanism means. It is in our seminary that the vestal
flame is to be kept alive; it is thence it is to spread anew over our own and
the sister States.'
This letter is especially revealing. It demonstrates quite unambiguously
Jefferson's disdain for Blackstone, a topic that will be more fully explored
later in this Article. It also reveals in clear terms Jefferson's own consti-
tutional principles, as he described them, as those of a "whig," and that
Jefferson considered the choice of a "whig" as law professor to be vital in
ensuring that the "vestal flame" of republicanism be kept alive at the
University to which he devoted the last years of his life.
It is significant that in his letter to Madison, Jefferson expressed the
key distinction in terms of "whig" and "tory": Jefferson sought a profes-
sor who had studied the sound "whig" principles of Coke, and not one of
the new breed of lawyers who imbibed the "honeyed Mansfieldism" of
Blackstone's Commentaries, with its "tory hue." The distinction was not
merely academic; to an American of the Revolutionary generation, the
words "whig" and "tory" had, of course, precise meanings. But use of
these terms was not limited to the context of the struggle for indepen-
dence, that is, to the division of the people into Patriots and Loyalists
during the Revolution. The perceived division into "whig" and "tory"-
the former associated with the changes the American Revolution
wrought, the latter with the British monarchical system of government
that the Americans had rejected-continued into the 1790s, when it
animated the political struggles of the so-called "first party system" that
pitted Jeffersonian Republicans against the Federalists.2 And, as Jeffer-
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Feb. 17, 1826), reprinted in 12 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 456 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905).
2. Jefferson regarded the Federalists as monarchists, and he frequently called them "tory," in
contrast to the "whig" principles he associated with his own "republican" party. See, e.g., Letter
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son's letter to Madison so poignantly illustrates, use of the "whig" and
"tory" labels persisted well into the nineteenth century, even after the
Federalist party had met its demise and the Republicans had begun to
split into the Jacksonian Democrats and the Whigs, the forerunners of
the two major political parties in modem America.a
Recent scholarship concerning early American political and constitu-
tional thought has sought to identify the sources of the conflict that di-
vided Americans during the Jeffersonian period. Scholars generally have
agreed that English political and constitutional traditions were enor-
mously influential in shaping the contours of early American political
and constitutional thought. They have disagreed, however, about the
identity of those traditions: some emphasize the influence of a "classi-
cal" or "civic" republican tradition4 that they can trace back to Renais-
sance and even ancient political thought; others stress the influence of a
more modem "liberal" tradition.
Unfortunately, debate over the relative merits of these two schools of
thought often has obscured the true nature of early American thought,
particularly with regard to those aspects related to the development of a
uniquely American constitutionalism. Scholars-at first historians and
political scientists, and more recently legal scholars-who have become
more enamored with the civic republican implications of early American
thought have overlooked the "whig" basis of that thought. As a result,
much recent scholarship about early American constitutionalism has
been seriously misguided.
A. "Liberalism" versus "Civic Republicanism'" A False Debate
Before the mid-1960s virtually all historians agreed that the sources of
early American ideas about government lay in a "liberal" tradition em-
from Thomas Jefferson to Lafayette (June 16, 1792), reprinted in 24 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 85 (John Catanzariti ed., 1990); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Wise (Feb. 12, 1798),
quoted in DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 364-65 (1972). On the first
party system generally, see RICHARD BUEL, SECURING THE REVOLUTION: IDEOLOGY IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS, 1789-1815 (1972); JOSEPH CHARLES, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYS-
TEM (1956); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840 (1970).
3. On the demise of the Federalist party and the transformation of the first party system of the
1790s into the second party system of the 1830s-50s, see generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 2;
SHAW LIVERMORE, THE TWILIGHT OF FEDERALISM (1962).
4. This Article generally uses the term "civic republican" to identify the tradition that is vari-
ously called civic republican, civic humanist, classical republican, or simply republican.
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phasizing individual rights.5 Caroline Robbins was enormously influen-
tial in tracing the importance of a number of English liberal thinkers-
from Henry Neville in 1680 to James Burgh in 1774-to the thought of
Americans of the Revolutionary generation. 6
Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, challenges to this liberal consen-
sus appeared in historical scholarship. In an article published in 1965,
J.G.A. Pocock directly challenged Robbins and the liberal school.7
Pocock identified the seventeenth-century English theorist, James Har-
rington, as the central figure (or "fountainhead") through whom the
eighteenth century inherited a "civic republican" tradition of thought
rooted in classical writings.' This tradition emphasized the civic charac-
ter of human beings: humans as "political," in Aristotle's sense, as citi-
zens of thepolis.9 By emphasizing the subordination of private interests
to a transcendent "public good," this tradition offered a communitarian
alternative to the individualism implicit in the liberal tradition. In the
late 1960s, Gordon Wood, building on the scholarship of Bernard
Bailyn,10 suggested that this civic republican tradition was the most po-
tent influence on American Revolutionary thought.1 Six years later,
5. The emphasis on liberalism in early American scholarship mirrored the broader emphasis
on liberalism found in the so-called consensus historians' interpretation of American history gener-
ally. Louis Hartz's book, The Liberal Tradition in America, is the seminal exposition of the liberal
interpretation. Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
6. CAROLINE ROBBINS, THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN: STUDIES IN
THE TRANSMISSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND CIRCUMSTANCE OF ENGLISH LIBERAL THOUGHT FROM
THE RESTORATION OF CHARLES II UNTIL THE WAR WITH THE THIRTEEN COLONIES (1959).
7. J.G.A. Pocock, Machiavelli, Harrington, and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth
Century, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 3d ser. 549 (1965).
8. Id. at 551-52. In his article, Pocock argued that, through Harrington, Anglo-American
political thought had inherited the civic republican tradition that, in turn, had been passed on by
Machiavelli from classical writers, chiefly Aristotle and Polybius. Thus Pocock's interpretation pos-
ited an elaborate chain of influence in the history of ideas, starting with ancient Greece and republi-
can Rome, then passing through Renaissance Italy to seventeenth-century England, and finally
reaching eighteenth-century England and its American colonies.
9. See, eg., ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1113, 1129 (Richard
McKeon ed., 1941) (Book I, chapter 2).
10. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967),
11. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
Although he argued that the ideology of the American Revolution was "grounded in the best, most
enlightened knowledge of the eighteenth century"-i.e., the classical civic republican tradition-
Wood also emphasized that the debate over ratification of the Constitution "transformed" that ideol-
ogy, bringing an end to the classical theory of politics and inaugurating a new, uniquely American
science of politics that made the assumptions of civic republicanism irrelevant. Id. at 32-33, 606-
615. Many scholars who cite Wood's book in support of the civic republican interpretation ignore
the full implications of his thesis.
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Pocock's monumental work, The Machiavellian Moment, 2 placed the
founding of the American republic fully within a Machiavellian "civic
humanist" tradition and argued that the Revolution and Constitution to-
gether ought to be considered as "the last act of the civic Renaissance." 13
In the past fifteen years, several scholars, following the course Pocock
suggested, have interpreted American political thought of the early na-
tional period in terms of the civic republican paradigm.14 More recently,
this so-called "republican synthesis," virtually accepted as the gospel re-
visionist view among historians and political scientists,15 has appealed to
legal scholars.1 6
Much of the appeal of civic republicanism to legal scholars undoubt-
edly has been its emphasis on communitarian as opposed to individualis-
12. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975). Pocock's main thesis may be summarized as
follows: Florentine political thought in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries developed the "civic
humanist" perspective that drew on Aristotle's concepts of citizenship and the mixed constitution as
a balance of the one, the few, and the many. (The latter concept, refined and linked to the notion of
a cycle of constitutional decay, was drawn from Polybius). From the republican theory of
Machiavelli and his contemporaries emerged the ideal of active citizenship in a republic, as a re-
sponse to the decay of the republic. The republic itself was self-doomed because the pursuit of
individual goods was incompatible with the maintenance of civic virtue; only through something like
"a partnership in virtue" among all citizens could the republic persist. Therefore, the civic human-
ists stressed the Aristotelian assumption that the development of the individual towards self-fulfill-
ment was possible only when the individual acted as citizen in the polis, or republic. Harrington
adopted this assumption in his work, Oceana, through which it influenced English political thought
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hence derived the Anglo-American preoccupation with
"virtue," in the civic humanist sense, and with it, the concern that "corruption" (i.e., self-interested
use of political power) would upset the delicate "balance" of the English mixed constitution. This
theory is discussed more fully in Part II, infra.
13. Id. at 462.
14. Accordingly, these scholars generally have viewed the Federalist-Republican debates of the
1790s as a replay of the Court and Country polarity of English politics in the early decades of the
eighteenth century. They have considered the clash between Hamilton and Jefferson to have mir-
rored the battle between Robert Walpole, the Court politician, and Viscount Bolingbroke, his Coun-
try opponent. See, eg., LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION 130-140 (1978); DREW
McCoy, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980).
15. See, eg., Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the
New American Republic, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 3d ser. 3 (1986); RICHARD K. MATrHEWS, THE
RADICAL POLITICS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: A REVISIONIST VIEW (1984); Robert E. Shalhope,
Toward a Republican Synthesis The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American
Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 3d ser. 49 (1972); ROBERT E. SHALHOPE, JOHN TAYLOR OF
CAROLINE: PASTORAL REPUBLICAN (1980).
16. See, eg., Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Sympo-
sium, Roads Not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking in Modern Constitutional Theory, 85
Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Richard H. Fallon, hat is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989).
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tic values. In translating the communal values of civic republicanism to
the realm of constitutional theory, many scholars-both liberal and con-
servative-have downplayed the Founders' concern for individual rights
and instead have stressed the concept of majority rule.17 This scholar-
ship implies in part that government, far from being a necessary evil, is
rather a benign or even a positive good in persons' lives, and that the
essential function of a constitution is therefore not to limit or control, but
rather to empower government.1 8
Meanwhile, the debate among historians and political scientists has
gone beyond republican revivalism and back to a liberal revivalism of
sorts. Even during the heyday of republican revivalism, Pocock did not
lack critics. Responding to some in a review article, he has conceded
that the political thought of the Founders-or at least, the Jeffersoni-
ans-contained tensions between liberal and republican values.19 Isaac
Kramnick has gone further, suggesting that Lockean liberalism, the tra-
dition emphasizing individual rights, profoundly influenced radical
Whigs on both sides of the Atlantic by the middle decades of the eight-
eenth century. 20
Foremost among Pocock's critics, and an exponent of what Pocock
calls the "neo-Lockean" interpretation, has been Joyce Appleby. Critical
of attempts to interpret the American Revolution in premodern terms,
17. Compare Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1132
(1991) (the "main thrust" of the Bill of Rights was "not to impede popular majorities, but to em-
power them") with ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 178 (1990) ("the Constitution assumes the liberties of self-government, not merely
those liberties that consist in being free of government," and that the "freedom to govern" is impor-
tant to the individuals in a political community).
18. See, eg., Cass R. Sunstein, The Republican Civic Tradition: Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). Sunstein does not entirely disregard the need to limit or control govern-
mental power, but he argues that the way to do so is through shared commitment to certain republi-
can principles: 1) deliberation in politics, which "civil virtue" makes possible; 2) equality of political
actors; 3) universalism; and 4) citizenship, manifesting itself in broadly guaranteed rights of partici-
pation. Id. at 1541.
19. J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment Revisited, 53 J. MOD. HIST. 49, 69-70 (1981).
20. Isaac Kramnick, Republican Revisionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 629 (1982) [herein-
after Kramnick, Republican Revisionism]. See also ISAAC KRAMNICK, REPUBLICANISM AND
BOURGEOIS RADICALISM: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN LATE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND AND
AMERICA (1990). John Patrick Diggins and Thomas Pangle also have criticized the application to
American thought of the Pocock argument about civic republicanism, essentially arguing instead
that Louis Hartz's liberal interpretation was right after all. JOHN DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF
AMERICAN POLITICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1985);
THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE
AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE (1988).
[Vol. 70:131
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/5
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
Appleby has argued that the evolving tradition of economic liberalism,
expressed in the writings of Adam Smith and others who emphasized
individual self interest, was an important contributing force to Revolu-
tionary ideology.2 Appleby has gone so far as to argue that "the princi-
ple of hope," a forward-looking confidence in commercial prosperity
through an expanding free market economy, was the essence of Jefferso-
nian Republicanism and of its challenge to the civic republicanism of the
Federalists.22 Thus, the historiographical debate has come full circle,
back to liberalism, leaving students of early American political thought
with two opposed traditions-or rather, revisionist interpretations-on
which to draw.23
The problem for constitutional scholars is that neither of these inter-
pretations fully comprehends the "whig" ideas that early Americans, and
particularly the Jeffersonian Republicans, professed. The debate Pocock
and his critics generated has distorted early American ideology by forc-
ing scholars to interpret the Founders' ideas solely in terms of one or
another of these two competing traditions. By thus imposing a modern-
ist gloss on eighteenth-century writings, this false debate has caused
scholars to lose sight of the "whig" essence of the Founders' thought.
Rather than moving us closer to understanding the intellectual world of
Jefferson, Madison, and their contemporaries, the debate has moved us
further away.
The failure to comprehend fully the political thought of the Founders
has compounded the difficulty in comprehending fully the "whig" as-
pects of early American constitutionalism. An argument that the basic
21. Joyce Appleby, The Social Origins ofAmerican Revolutionary Ideology, 64 J. AM. Hisr. 935
(1978). In an article that sought to demonstrate "what is still American" in the political thought of
Jefferson. Appleby focused on the influence of the French philosopher and economiste, Destutt de
Tracy, on Jefferson, whose high regard for de Tracy's works in political economy indicates the extent
to which his mature thinking on the subject was indeed "liberal." Joyce Appleby, What is Still
American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson?, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 3d ser. 287 (1982).
De Tracy surpassed Adam Smith in his espousal of free-market principles and criticized Smith's
agrarianism, suggesting instead that the labor of the manufacturer and merchant capitalist was "not
more or less essentially productive" than that of the farmer. ANTOINE DEsrtrrT DE TRACY, COM-
MENTARY AND REVIEW OF MONTESQUIEu 213-14 (Thomas Jefferson trans., Philadelphia 1811); see
also ANTOINE DEsTuTr DE TRACY, TREATISE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (Thomas Jefferson trans.,
Georgetown 1817).
22. JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF
THE 1790s (1984).
23. Compare Banning, supra note 15, with Joyce Appleby, Republicanisn in Old and New Con-
texts, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 3d ser. 20 (1986). For another recent critique of the "civic republican"
interpretation, see PANGLE, supra note 20, at 23-39.
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function of constitutions, as understood by Americans of the Founders'
generation, was to empower "the people" to govern, overlooks the es-
sence of whig theory, which emphasized the perpetual need to limit gov-
ernmental power, even in a republic. The object of constitutionalism is,
after all, to control or to limit governmental power.2'
Another sign of the artificiality of the "republican revival" lies in most
scholars' failure to cite the primary sources, the writings of early Ameri-
cans themselves or the writings of those earlier theorists (whether "lib-
eral" or "republican") who influenced them. Most scholars, rather than
grappling with the seventeenth- or eighteenth-century sources them-
selves, simply cite either Pocock or his critics,25 thus perpetuating the
problem of misunderstanding.
B. "Whiggism": A Restored Understanding
Recent scholarship thus has demonstrated the difficulty of trying to
pigeonhole early American thought. If all the scholars are right, in some
sense, then the true sources of the Framers' ideology-the key to what
was uniquely "American" in their political and constitutional thinking-
may lie in the blending of the liberal and civic republican traditions.26
The debate over the two rival interpretations of early American political
thought, however, has distorted the similarity between the two tradi-
tions. Since the concept of autonomy was vital to both the liberal and
civic republican paradigms, scholars can discuss the political ideas of the
radical Whigs of mid-eighteenth century England from either perspec-
tive.27 Starting from either libertarian or civic humanist assumptions,
24. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
25. The failure to cite primary authorities perhaps is understandable because of the difficulty in
accessing these works, many of which have not been reprinted in modem editions and which there-
fore are available only in rare book collections. Several of the older works also are written in a style
that is difficult for the modem reader, though surely not much more difficult than Pocock's Machia-
vellian Moment. Pocock's work generally-and that book in particular-is like the emperor's new
clothes, universally applauded but rarely comprehended.
26. Ralph Ketcham has argued that Jeffersonian Republicanism is best viewed as "transi-
tional," and that the effort to define it wholly in terms of either the civic republican or the liberal
interpretations misses the mark. Jefferson, Ketcham argues, was "at once intrigued by the new ideas
of enterprise, prosperity, and personal liberty that attracted forward-looking Anglo-Americans of his
day, and enthralled by the classical and civic republican prescriptions" of Country polemicists of
early eighteenth-century Britain. Ralph Ketcham, Book Review, 42 WM. & MARY Q. 3d ser. 399,
402 (1985) (reviewing JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER (1984)).
27. Consider, for example, the treatment of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, authors of
the early eighteenth-century tracts, Cato's Letters. Compare POCOCK, supra note 12, at 467-74 (in-
terpreting Cato's Letters as an "unmistakably Machiavellian and neo-Harringtonian critique of cor-
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these radical Whigs all reached the same conclusion: members of society
always must keep a watchful eye on government, for the corrupting influ-
ence of power always threatens the autonomy vital to a well-ordered soci-
ety of free individuals. This conviction defined the political stance of
what people in the eighteenth century called an "Independent" or
"Real" Whig.
This Article seeks to offer a fresh perspective on the sources of early
American constitutional thought by examining, on its own terms, the
essence of "whig" ideology and its origins in English radicalism. When
Jefferson, Madison, and their contemporaries described themselves as
"whigs," they used the term in a fairly precise sense, the full meaning of
which was known to eighteenth-century Americans, but which is ob-
scured in our day. As they used the word, "whig" described a deeply
held set of attitudes about the nature of society, the law, and government,
attitudes that shaped Americans' conceptions of what today we call
"constitutionalism."
Constitutionalism is, as one historian has observed, "a very old con-
cept-perhaps as old as government itself." It is rooted in "a simple
idea: that power requires restraint."2 But because restraint assumes
various forms in different periods of history and in different societies, the
form of constitutionalism has changed significantly over the past several
centuries. Modern American constitutionalism bears little resemblance
to its ancient and medieval antecedents. Indeed, as a distinguished
scholar of the subject has suggested, although its antecedents may be
found in older doctrines of fundamental law, the idea of constitutional-
ism did not achieve its modern form in the English-speaking world until
"law" came to be understood as positive, rather than based in custom.
This understanding developed in England during the seventeenth
century.29
Constitutionalism is linked with the distrust of political power and the
need to disperse otherwise concentrated power. Thus, the concept
emerged historically as a reaction against the concentration of power that
ruption") with ROBBINS, supra note 6, at 120-25 (interpreting Cato's Letters as essentially
libertarian).
28. GEORGE DARGO, ROOTS OF THE REPUBLIC: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EARLY AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 15 (1974).
29. CARL J. FRIEDRICH & ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, Introduction to FROM THE DECLARA-
TION OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION: THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
at vii, ix (Carl J. Friedrich & Robert G. McCloskey eds., 1954).
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accompanied the consolidation of modem nation states. It was, in
other words, a reflection of Lord Acton's famed maxim, that all power
tends to corrupt and that absolute power corrupts absolutely. Modem
Anglo-American constitutionalism, moreover, took shape during that pe-
riod associated with the rise of individualism. 31 The exercise of individ-
ual freedom presupposes the existence of institutions that provide the
restraint without which all power-of the individual, the group, or the
state-tends to be abused. The most effective institution to provide the
necessary restraint on the power of the state, in the modem era, is the
constitution.
Jefferson, Madison, and their contemporaries identified as "whig" a
form of constitutionalism based on a profound distrust of concentrated
political power and, with it, an especially intense devotion to the ideal of
limited government. This "Whig tradition of political pessimism," as
one historian has called it, had its direct antecedents in English opposi-
tion thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.32 Whig consti-
tutionalism arose primarily from the notion of a "higher," or
fundamental, law-a traditional conception in English law-to which
certain opposition writers appealed in order to counter the arguments
advanced by the proponents of the relatively modem concept of sover-
eignty.33 The source of American whig constitutionalism lies in the un-
easy tension between these two nearly opposite concepts in the
mainstream of English constitutional development, and in the dissenting
views of British "Real Whigs," views that the resolution of that tension
spawned.
Parts II and III of this Article sketch in very broad terms the English
30. CARL J. FRIEDRICH, LIMITED GOVERNMENT: A COMPARISON 14 (1974).
31. Id. at 32 (To individualism, "constitutionalism owes the distinguishing feature of modem,
in contrast to ancient and medieval, constitutionalism.").
32. GERALD STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERN-
MENT 96-97, 104 (1970).
33. Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 849-50 (1978). In tracing the origins of the notion of
an unwritten fundamental law in American constitutionalism, Grey also has emphasized the role of
legal and political theories from the Enlightenment, particularly those found in the great treatises on
the law of nature and nations written by Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Vattel, and Rutherford. These
natural law ideas, Grey argues, "renewed and fortified, particularly for Americans, the traditional
English conception of fundamental law when it lost institutional support in the eighteenth-century
English politics." Id. at 850. The influence of Enlightenment thought, however, is outside the scope
of this Article, which focuses on the influence of the radical English Whig historical, political, and
common-law traditions. How Enlightenment thought further shaped the ideas that Americans de-
rived from these traditions remains an important question that deserves further scholarly attention.
[Vol. 70:131
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background essential to a full understanding of American whig constitu-
tionalism and of early American ideas about a constitution-ideas that,
after all, concerned the English Constitution as it had developed by the
mid-eighteenth century. Part III suggests that the antecedents of early
American thought may be traced to those lines of development that de-
parted from the mainstream of eighteenth-century English constitution-
alism; in other words, Part III suggests that Americans of the
Revolutionary generation were influenced by their English contemporar-
ies who were the radical, "Independent," or "Real" Whigs.
Part IV of the Article outlines the substance of English radical Whig
thought, identifying the fundamental ideas found in the works of three
separate but interrelated groups of writers influential in early America:
Whig common-law lawyers, Whig historians, and Whig philosophers of
government. Drawing on many of the books that Americans of the Rev-
olutionary generation read, this Section presents a synthesis of each of
these aspects of English radical Whig thought.
Finally, Part V of the Article addresses the question implicit in Jeffer-
son's 1826 letter to Madison: why he and many of his contemporaries
viewed Blackstone's Commentaries as "tory" and, hence, essentially ir-
relevant to the American legal and constitutional tradition. In explain-
ing precisely how Blackstone departed from the radical Whig tradition,
this Part of the Article identifies that aspect of English radical Whig con-
stitutionalism that became the basis for what is unique in American con-
stitutional law.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THE DUAL HERITAGE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW
Two major lines of development are discernible in Anglo-American
constitutionalism: one that ends in the essential distinguishing feature of
the English Constitution, Parliamentary sovereignty, 4 and the other that
ends in the essential distinguishing feature of American state and federal
constitutions, the concept of the constitution as a higher law that limits
the legislative power."5
These two constitutional concepts are virtually antithetical. Parlia-
34. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37 (8th
ed. 1915) (Parliamentary sovereignty is "the dominant characteristic" of the British constitution).
35. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 176-78 (1960).
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mentary sovereignty is just that: Parliament is "an absolutely sovereign
legislature," with the right to "make or unmake any law whatever," and
"no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a right
to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament." 6 The concept of
the constitution as higher, or fundamental, law, on the other hand, ex-
pressly places limits on the power of the legislature. As it has evolved in
America, the concept has linked two almost opposite values-a liberta-
rian concern for the protection of individual rights, and a democratic
concern for the preservation of majority will-together with the basic
notion, often referred to as "popular sovereignty," that all legitimate
political power derives from the people. The use of the constitution as an
instrument for effectuating popular sovereignty is illustrated most dra-
matically by the peculiarly American doctrine of judicial review, which
affords the judiciary the power to declare legislative acts unconstitu-
tional, and thus to treat them as null and void.37 Thus, popular sover-
eignty as manifested in America has reached a result quite different from
that of Parliamentary sovereignty in Britain. Indeed, one legitimately
may ask whether "popular sovereignty" is a misnomer and not, properly
speaking, a form of sovereignty at all.
To understand fully the distinction, one must first understand the con-
cept of sovereignty, as it had evolved by the time of the English Civil
War, in the mid-seventeenth century.
Sovereignty, a comparatively modern notion unknown to the medieval
world, is the idea that there must exist, somewhere in the body politic, a
single, undivided, final power, higher in legal authority than any other
power-a power itself subject to no law other than the law of nature and
36. DIcEY, supra note 34, at 37-38. Because Parliament is sovereign, it is "neither the agent of
the electors nor in any sense a trustee for its constituents," Dicey adds, id. at 45, citing as the best
illustration of this principle the Septennial Act of 1716. By that statute, 1 George I. st. 2, ch. 38, the
Parliament then sitting extended its legal duration from three to seven years. "There are countries,
and notably the United States," Dicey notes, "where an Act like the Septennial Act would be held
legally invalid," but under the British constitution, Parliament made "a legal though unprecedented
use" of its powers. Id.
37. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893). The tension between libertarian and majoritarian concerns is manifest
in the recurring debate between advocates of greater judicial activism and advocates of greater defer-
ence to the legislature. This debate in recent years has focused largely on the issue of nontextual, or
unenumerated, constitutional rights, such as the right to privacy. Thomas C. Grey, for example, has
suggested the legitimacy of a "noninterpretive" mode of review that would permit judges to enforce
principles of liberty and justice even when they do not find the normative content of those principles
within the text of the Constitution. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,
27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975).
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of God. The idea derived from elements found in classical political the-
ory, Roman law, and medieval thought, but it came into English thought
most directly through sixteenth-century writings, especially those of Jean
Bodin, that sought to defend monarchical supremacy.38
The emergence of the notion of sovereignty in English political
thought coincided with the significant political reality of the sixteenth
century: the enhanced power and prestige of the monarchy under Henry
VIII and his successors. Parliament played a vital role in the concentra-
tion of authority in the Tudor monarchy. The institution, which modem
historians most accurately refer to as "the king's parliament of England,"
had its origins in the great councils and assemblies, of varied composi-
tion, that English kings called from time to time in the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries. a9 Medieval kings summoned parliaments, albeit
irregularly, because of considerations of "practical necessity": they con-
vened great councils and assemblies that consisted of men whose good-
will and support (financial and otherwise) were necessary to the success
of their plans. Because the "king in parliament" could accomplish more
than could the king alone, the monarchs most ambitious of authority
made the most use of parliaments; as Bertrand de Jouvenal notes, Henry
VIII was both a great authoritarian and "one of the most 'parliamentary'
of English Kings."'
At the time of the Reformation, before the notion of sovereignty had
been fully articulated, the traditional view of law and government was
one permeated with notions of custom and "natural law," derived from
classical and medieval writers. Aristotle had taught that there was a dis-
tinction between "special law," the written law that governed a particu-
lar community, and "general law," those unwritten equitable principles
"supposed to be acknowledged everywhere."', Aristotle, in the Rhetoric,
accordingly advised advocates that when they had no case according to
the written law, they should "appeal to the universal law, and insist on
38. BERTRAND DE JOUVENAL, SOVEREIGNTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POLITICAL GOOD 181-
85 (1957). De Jouvenal quotes the late sixteenth-century jurist, Charles L'Oyseau, who defined sov-
ereignty as "of unlimited power and authority," but who also found "very important limits" in the
laws of God and of nature and in "the fundamental laws of the state." Id. at 182, 184 (quoting
CHARLES L'OYSEAU, TRAICTE DES SEINGNEURIES 25, 9 (1609)). See also BAILYN, supra note 10,
at 198-99.
39. G.O. SAYLES, THE KING'S PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1974).
40. DE JOUVENAL, supra note 38, at 176, 178.
41. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric, in THE BAsIc WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 9, at 1317, 1359
(Book I, Chapter 10).
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its greater equity and justice."'42 And, in his Politics, Aristotle expressed
a preference for limited monarchy, or "kingship according to law," be-
cause, law being "reason unaffected by desire," the "rule of the law.., is
preferable to that of any individual. '43
Like Aristotle, Cicero had taught that good laws and the best constitu-
tional arrangements come through experience, "based upon the genius,
not of one man, but of many" and founded "not in one generation, but in
a long period of several centuries and many ages of men." 44 True law
thus was in accord with customary practice and was informed by what
Cicero, later echoed by Aquinas, had called "right reason in agreement
with nature... of universal application, unchanging and everlasting...
one eternal and unchangeable law.., valid for all nations and all times,"
and above which there was God, "the author of this law, its promulgator,
and its enforcing judge.""
This Ciceronian conception of higher law pervaded the political
thought of the Middle Ages, as Edward S. Corwin has shown.46 It re-
ceived its classic statement in medieval English law in the great treatise
written by Bracton, Henry of Bratton, a judge of the King's Bench in the
reign of Henry III. "The King himself," wrote the author, "ought not to
be subject to man, but subject to God and to the law, for the law makes
the King."'4 7 This medieval view of the supremacy of law survived the
Renaissance and, as Thomas Grey notes, retained much of its influence
despite the enhancement and centralization of state power of the Tudor
era.
48
The constitution was, as Charles Inglis described it nearly two centu-
ries later, "that assemblage of laws, customs, and institutions which form
the general system according to which the several powers of the state are
distributed and their respective rights are secured to the different mem-
bers of the community. ' 49  According to this view of law and govern-
42. Id. at 1374 (Book I, Chapter 15).
43. AusToTLE, supra note 9, at 1201-02 (Book III, Chapter 16).
44. CICERO, De Re Publica, in DE REPUBLICA AND DE LEGIBUS 112, 113 (Clinton W. Keyes
trans., 1928) (Book II, paragraph 2).
45. Id. at 211 (Book III, 34).
46. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 17-23 (1955).
47. HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE [ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND], at f.5b (Twiss ed., 1854), quoted in CORWIN, supra note 46, at 27.
48. Grey, supra note 33, at 851.
49. Charles Inglis, The True Interest ofAmerica... Strictures on a Pamphlet Intitled Common
Sense ... (Philadelphia 1776), quoted in BAILYN, supra note 10, at 175.
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ment, Parliament did not, strictly speaking, make law; it rather
discovered, and then enunciated, the law. The problem of "unconstitu-
tional" law was unknown because all law, by definition, was constitu-
tional-that is, all law was Common Law. And Common Law was "the
perfect ideal of law; for it is natural reason developed and expounded by
a collective wisdom of many generations."'
This traditional view, while perfectly suited to the feudal system of
well defined reciprocal rights and duties, was not well suited to the legal
dynamism that Reformation legislation represented. Neither customary
practice nor "natural law" suggested that Henry VIII ought to be made
supreme head of the Church of England, yet the Act of Supremacy made
him so "by authority of this present parliament.""1 And, in so doing, the
statute significantly readjusted the existing arrangement of governmental
institutions, laws, and customs that together had formed the
"4constitution."
Because only Sir Thomas More and a few others opposed Henry's
break from Rome, the Reformation afforded little need, hence opportu-
nity, for the development of a theory of justification. At his trial, More
raised fundamental questions about the English Constitution that were
nevertheless troublesome. The judges adroitly avoided the basic issue,
whether the act of Parliament was unlawful.52 They could have turned
to St. German's Doctor and Student dialogue, written a few years earlier,
for an answer, but did not-perhaps because it went too far. Indeed, the
student's answer hit on a key notion, that King in Parliament was
omnicompetent and omnipotent in "all temporal things."53 Once it is
admitted that Parliament may, for example, ordain by statute the type of
clothing a priest may wear, it is not too great an abstraction to suggest
that virtually all matters of religion may in effect fall subject to statute.
Englishmen in the Tudor period were not apt to criticize their mon-
arch and, accordingly, were not apt to suggest that the political realities
of their time were extraordinarily unprecedefnted. Ironically, then, in a
time of profound social and political change, the notion of sovereignty
50. CORWIN, supra note 46, at 34 (quoting FIGGIS, DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS 228-30 (2d ed.
1914)). Sir Edward Coke held this attitude toward the common law. 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTI-
TUTEs *179 ("The common law is the absolute perfection of reason.").
51. Supremacy Act (1534), in I SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 311 (Carl
Stephenson & Frederick G. Marcham eds. & trans., 1972).
52. See J. Duncan M. Derrett, The Trial ofSir Thomas More, 79 ENG. HIST. REV. 450 (1964).
53. CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, THE DOCTOR AND STUDENT 303-319 (W. Muchall ed.,
1874).
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evolved very cautiously. Indeed, as originally formulated, the notion of
sovereignty entailed some important limitations appropriate to its classi-
cal and medieval origins. Sovereign meant supreme, but not arbitrary, to
sixteenth-century writers: the laws of God and of nature and the consti-
tution limited the authority of the sovereign. Even a sovereign prince as
powerful as Henry VIII could not, in theory, transgress his duties to
God. Neither could he transgress his obligation to respect natural law
and the natural rights (including private-property rights) of his subjects,
nor his obligation to act in accordance with the fundamental laws of the
realm.54
The tension between Reformation legislation and the traditional view
of the nature of law, though felt, was mitigated also by conservatism in
other areas, particularly the common-law rules concerning the alienabil-
ity of land. The Parliament that threw off the Pope could not create an
action of ejectment for freeholders." Nevertheless, Sir Thomas Smith in
his Commonwealth of England, written near the middle of Elizabeth's
reign, wrote of Parliament as if it were omnipotent: "The most high and
absolute power of the realme of Englande, consisteth in the Parliament.
... The Parliament abrogateth olde lawes, maketh newe... and hath the
power of the whole realme, both the head and the body."'56 This is so,
Smith reasoned, "[flor everie Englishman is entended to bee there pres-
ent either in person or by procuration and attornies."57 And, in the case
of Wimbish v. Taillebois, in his dictum on the nature of the transfer of
property by the Statute of Uses, Chief Justice Montague saw the statute,
not as an act of government, but as an enunciation of the transfer of
property between private persons and registered in the "high court" of
54. DE JOUVENAL, supra note 38, at 185.
55. By the fourteenth century, lessees were granted an action against those who dispossessed
them, known as the action de ejectionefirmae, or simply the action of ejectment. It was a trespass
action and, accordingly, resulted in money damages for the successful plaintiff. In the sixteenth
century, the king's courts made this remedy even more attractive by giving the dispossessed lessee
who won an ejectment action specific recovery of the land. The action was so far superior to the real
actions available to freeholders that dispossessed freeholders took advantage of the action through
the expedient of a ficticious lessee. This practice continued well into the nineteenth century. In 1833
all real actions other than ejeetment were abolished, but the fictions were not abolished until 1852.
See generally JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 254-55 (2d ed.
1979); see also THEODORE E.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY Or THE COMMON LAW 373-74
(5th ed. 1956).
56. THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 48-49 (L. Alston ed., 1906), quoted in
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Parliament.5"
There is something both quite conservative and quite revolutionary in
the reasoning of Smith and Montague. It was conservative in that they
couched it in the language of the medieval doctrine of taxation as a free
and spontaneous gift to the King. 9 There is no suggestion of absolute
power for Parliament to legislate, no suggestion of sovereignty, to indi-
cate that the judges faced the realities of an omnipotent state. Yet in the
concept of consent lay the seeds of the notion of sovereignty, and its
synthesis into the notion of popular sovereignty. This implication of the
fiction of virtual consent was, though not perceived as such at the time,
truly revolutionary.
Unlike the Tudor monarchs, who had consolidated their actual power
without making novel theoretical claims to sovereignty, the first Stuart
monarch, James I (who was less successful in obtaining the cooperation
of Parliament) asserted for himself an absolute legal authority. Against
his claims, the common law jurists and the Parliamentarians responded
by appealing to the traditional English conception of fundamental law.
By Charles I's reign, both sides of the great constitutional controversy
were debated in these terms: Parliamentarians like Edward Coke and
John Pym argued that fundamental law limited the King's as well as
Parliament's authority, while Royalists argued that this same fundamen-
tal law guaranteed the broad scope they claimed for the royal prerogative
58. Wimbish v. Taillebois (C.B. 1553), reported in THE COMMENTARIES OR REPORTS OF ED-
MUND PLOWDEN 38 (Edmund Plowden ed., London 1816). George Wimbish and his wife Elizabeth
sued Elizabeth Taillebois for trespass on land that Taillebois claimed as her property. The land in
question had been part of a manor that had been owned by Taillebois' husband, George, who was
also the grandfather of Elizabeth Wimbish. George Taillebois had granted the manor to a number of
feoffees, to the use of himself and his wife in special tail, and then sometime thereafter he died. The
suit primarily raised the question whether Elizabeth Wimbish, who was the next heir after the widow
Taillebois, was rightful owner of the land because the widow Taillebois had defeated her title by
being party to a fraudulent transfer. Although most of the justices kept closely to the technical
details of the case, Chief Justice Montague delivered dictum on the effect of the Statute of Uses.
Montague adhered to the older, medieval theory of legislation, which viewed a transfer of property
by general statute not as a sovereign act but rather as a conveyance of land made by each individual
owner and registered in the high court of Parliament: "[Tihe Parliament, (which is nothing but a
Court) may not be adjudged the Donor. For what the Parliament did was only a Conveyance of the
Land from one to another, and a Conveyance by Parliament does not make the Parliament Donor
... for when a Gift is made by Parliament, every Person in the Realm is privy to it, and assents to
It ...." Id. at 59. On the case generally, see Edward T. Lampson, Some New Light on the Growth of
Parliamentary Sovereignty: Wimbish v. Taillebois, 35 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 952 (1941).
59. This notion of taxes as "gifts" died hard. See FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 24-28 (1985).
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against parliamentary interference.' °
Early in the Stuart period, in the context of the great debate over fun-
damental law, the doctrine of the "ancient constitution" received its clas-
sic formulation. It was, as J.G.A. Pocock has shown, "the work of
common lawyers," and it was shaped by assumptions deeply planted, it
seems, in the minds of everyone trained in the study of the common law
of England.61 The common lawyer assumed, first, "that all the law in
England might properly be termed common law"; second, "that common
law was common custom, originating in the usages of the people and
declared, interpreted and applied in the courts"; and third, that since all
custom was by definition immemorial, "any declaration of law, whether
judgement or (with not quite the same certainty) statute, was a declara-
tion that its content had been usage since time immemorial."62 Thus
legal history became but "a series of declarations that the law is imme-
morial," and the idea of immemorial law became fixed as "one of the
cardinal political ideas of Stuart England."63 The idea cut both ways, as
defenders of royal prerogative were as apt to repair to the standard of
immemorial law; but it became particularly cogent in the hands of the
common lawyers.
The foremost advocate of the supremacy of the common law against
the pretensions of the Stuart monarchs was Sir Edward Coke, who in his
long career served, successively, as crown attorney, chief justice of the
Common Pleas, chief justice of the King's Bench, leader of the House of
Commons, law reporter and commentator on the law of England.
Although as Elizabeth's attorney general, Coke had shown a conspicuous
subservience to the royal interest, it was in his clashes as judge with
James I that Coke established his place in Anglo-American
constitutionalism.
Coke's basic doctrine was "'that the King hath no prerogative, but
that which the law and the land follows', and that of this the judges and
60. This paragraph and much of what is outlined in the succeeding several paragraphs largely
follow the excellent syntheses of Stuart constitutional development found in CORWIN, supra note 46,
at 41-57, and Grey, supra note 33, at 851-56.
61. J.G.A. POCOCK, Burke and the Ancient Constitution, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME:
ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY 202, 209 (1973) [hereinafter PoCOCK, Burke]. See
also J.G.A. PococK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 233-34 (1957) [herein-
after POCOCK, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION].
62. POCOCK, Burke, supra note 61, at 209.
63. Id. at 209-210.
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not the king were the authorized interpreters."" Following earlier case
precedents in which common-law judges imposed limits on ecclesiastical
authority, in Fuller's Case, for example, Coke reported that the construc-
tion of the statute setting up the court of High Commission "belongs to
the Judges of the Common Law."65 The implications of Fuller's Case
were profound, when one considers that it imposed common-law limita-
tions on the sort of broad jurisdiction over "all temporal things" that St.
German's Doctor and Student earlier had suggested belonged to the sov-
ereign power.
Even more profound implications of the notion of the primacy of the
common law may be found arising from Coke's celebrated declaration in
Dr. Bonham's Case, decided in 1610. The Royal College of Physicians,
under color of authority from an act of Parliament, had punished, with
fine and imprisonment, Dr. Thomas Bonham for practicing medicine in
London without a certificate from the College. The College censors,
moreover, pursuant to a provision in the statute of incorporation permit-
ting them to do so, kept half the fine for themselves. Dr. Bonham
brought an action for false imprisonment. Coke commented that the
statute should be disallowed because it was contrary to the well-under-
stood principle that no one can be a judge in his own cause: "[tihe cen-
sors cannot be judges, ministers and parties; judges to give sentence or
judgment; ministers to make summons; and parties to have the moiety of
the forfeiture, quia aliquis non debet esse Judex in propria causa. .. "
Coke then added his famous dictum, that an act of Parliament "against
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed"
may be declared void by the common law.66
This rudimentary version of the concept of judicial review was nearly
antithetical to the notion of sovereignty. Coke and the other common-
law judges suggested that no sovereign power, strictly speaking, exists,
for everywhere the common law sets limits. The common law, moreover,
was especially the province of the common-law judges, argued Coke in
his Prohibitions Upon the King, for the source of law was not natural, but
rather artificial, reasoning. Law, said Coke, "is an act which requires
64. COR WIN, supra note 46, at 43 (citing Proclamations, 12 Coke's Reports 74, 76 (1611)).
65. Nicholas Fuller's Case, 12 Coke Rep. 41, 77 Eng. Rep. 1322 (1607).
66. Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 113, 118, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610). For a general
discussion of the case, see S.E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham 's Case, 54 LAW Q. REv. 543 (1938). See also
CATHERINE BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE
315-16 (1957).
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long study and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance
of it."
67
Coke and the judges did not carry the banner of opposition very long:
their challenge to the authority of the ecclesiastical, and later the prerog-
ative courts was eventually quashed, and the debate shifted to Parlia-
ment. The importance of Coke and the common-law judges was not
their suggestion of the notion of judicial review-the revival of that con-
cept was left to American judges-but rather their suggestion that law
was something rather artificial. That view of law, different from the clas-
sic view of an Aquinas or a Fortescue, was a key element in the resolu-
tion of the tension between fundamental law and absolutism that had
been troublesome in the Tudor period. The changing view of the nature
of law marked a break away from traditional "natural law" thinking, and
the beginning of a shift toward the concept of legal positivism that was to
be felt more fully a few centuries later. That shift, coupled with a revival
of the concept of consent that Smith and Montague had earlier sug-
gested, paved the way for the notion of Parliamentary sovereignty.
The concept of consent was integral to James Whitelocke's argument,
in his 1610 Speech on Impositions, that the sovereign power of the State
resided in the King in Parliament. Without Parliament, the King may
not impose taxation; which is to say, the King may not impose without
the consent of Parliament.68 Underlying this argument was the notion of
sovereign power, orpotestas suprema, "a power that can control all other
powers and cannot be controlled but by itself,",69 which must be lodged
somewhere. Also underlying the argument was the historical precedent
that indicated that the powers of the King in Parliament were greater
than those of the King alone. Thus, proceeds Whitelocke's argument, if
sovereign power must be lodged somewhere, and if the power of the King
in Parliament is greater than the power of the King alone, then the King
in Parliament is sovereign. Further, since the right of imposition "hath
67. Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Coke Rep. 63, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (1608). Coke's collo-
quy with James I was anticipated, some 130 years earlier, by Sir John Fortescue, Henry VI's Chief
Justice, who in his Praises of the Laws of England had lauded the "mixed political government" of
England in contrast to French autocracy. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE
81-89 (S.B. Chrimes ed. & trans., 1942) (1545-46). Although Fortescue's work might be interpreted
merely as an expression of the late-medieval idealization of the common law, its "distinctive contri-
bution," Corwin has argued, is in its conception of the law "as a professional mystery, as the peculiar
science of bench and bar." CORWIN, supra note 46, at 37-38.
68. James Whitelocke's Speech on Impositions, June 1610, in 2 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF
STATE TRIALS 477-519 (William Cobbett ed., London 1809).
69. Id. at 482.
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so great a trust in it, by reason of the mischiefs [that] may grow to the
commonwealth by the abuses of it" that it "hath ever been ranked among
those rights of sovereign power," it followed that the power to tax re-
sided in the King in Parliament.7' Only in Parliament was the King "as-
sisted with the consent of the whole State" rather than "sole and
singular, guided merely by his own will."71
In placing the power of taxation in the category of sovereign powers,
and thereby among the powers of the King in Parliament, Whitelocke
discarded the distinction Chief Baron Fleming drew in Bates' Case, the
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate exercises of the royal pre-
rogative.72 In so doing, he implied that even if legitimately for the good
of the whole people, the King may not impose without the consent of
Parliament. If one applies the Smith-Montague argument that the con-
sent of Parliament was every man's consent, one can extend Whitelocke's
argument quite easily to the "no taxation without representation" argu-
ment of the American Revolution.
Whitelocke's speech thus is significant, both as a statement of the no-
tion of sovereignty in itself and as an early statement of the notion of
parliamentary sovereignty. No great leap of imagination is needed to see
that the essential component of the "King in Parliament" formulation
was not the King. The doctrine of the ancient constitution further aided
this line of development. When James I or Charles I was thought to be
claiming too wide and undefined a power, it was possible to argue that
law, customs, and privileges were not derived from the monarch's will at
all but rather were rooted in ancient custom. As Pocock has noted,
"Once that which was immemorial and that which was willed were set in
sharp contrast to one another, an ideological gap was opened which could
not be easily bridged, and the concept of the ancient constitution became
alternative to and incompatible with the sovereignty of the king. The idea
that it belonged to Parliament to define the content of the ancient constitu-
tion, and that all actions undertaken in its defence were legitimate, obvi-
70. Id.
71. Id. J.W. Gough has noted that the signficance of Whitelocke's speech was its implication
that only the King in Parliament was sovereign and that, therefore, the King out of Parliament was
limited by the the country's fundamental law and could not take his subjects' goods without their
consent. J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 59 (1955).
72. Bates' Case, 145 Eng. Rep. 267 (Ex. 1606), in 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY, supra note 51, at 435-37. James I had imposed a duty on the import of currants, which
Bates refused to pay as a tax not consented to by Parliament. The Court of Exchequer, in an opinion
by Chief Baron Fleming, upheld the impost as a lawful exercise of the royal prerogative on the
grounds that the legal incidence of the tax was not upon Bates but upon the foreign exporters. Id.
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ously led to the revolutionary sovereignty of that body....,73
The idea that Parliament itself was immemorial-that its existence was
rooted in the ancient constitution and not in the King's prerogative pow-
ers to call assemblies-further underlined Parliament's right to interpret
the law by its uncontrolled ordinances and resolutions. Thus, paradoxi-
cally, the development of parliamentary thought on the ancient constitu-
tion sapped the notion of custom, on which the idea of immemorial law
ultimately rested.74
These developing arguments for parliamentary sovereignty foreshad-
owed Thomas Hobbes' argument in Leviathan that sovereign power can-
not be divided. Sovereign power must be lodged in some one place,
either in the King or in the Sovereign Assembly (Parliament), but not in
both, for "a Kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand."75 Hobbes also
argued that "all Lawes, written and unwritten, have their authority and
force, from the Will of the Common-wealth." Laws need not be natural,
or just, or reasonable; they need only be ordained by the Will of the
Legislator, "for it is the Soveraign Power that obliges men to obey
them."76
Hobbes was not alone in challenging the concept of the ancient consti-
tution in the mid-seventeenth century. Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha,
written in the 1640s but not published until 1680, based the absolute
authority of kings-with divine sanction-on the natural authority of fa-
thers over children. Denying the possibility of such a thing as immemo-
rial law, Filmer argued that every custom "at first became lawful only by
some superior power which did either command or consent" to its begin-
ning. This superior power, Filmer thought, must ultimately reside in the
will of some one man; thus the original sovereign was Adam, and the
absolute sovereignty which he enjoyed-being by definition unalien-
able-descended intact to his successor, Charles II, the lawfully consti-
tuted King of Filmer's day."
With Hobbes and Filmer, the modem notion of sovereignty thus
reached its full development. The limits that originally had constrained
sovereignty-the law of God, nature, and the constitution-had van-
73. POCOCK, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 234.
74. Id. at 234-35.
75. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 88-94 (London 1651).
76. Id. at 137-45.
77. POCOCK, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 188-89 (quoting Sir Robert Filmer,
Patriarcha and Other Political Works 106-107 (P. Laslett ed., 1949)).
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ished, leaving sovereign power restricted only by its capacity to compel
obedience.
The ideas of these two very important theoretical proponents of unlim-
ited sovereignty nevertheless won little acceptance in the arena of legal
and political controversy. Despite the obvious political reality of the lat-
ter half of the eighteenth century-the dramatic rise in importance of
Parliament, and particularly the House of Commons-the notion of Par-
liament as sovereign remained obscure. Rather, the concept of the an-
cient constitution, and the associated belief in immemorial law, "was the
nearly universal belief of Englishmen" in the seventeenth century.7 8 By
the beginning of the eighteenth century the concept had become further
identified with the "mixed," or "balanced" government model. This
model implied that neither Parliament nor King alone, but rather "King
in Parliament," was sovereign.
Corinne C. Weston has called other historians' attention to the impor-
tance of Charles I's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, drafted in 1642
just two months before the outbreak of the Civil War, as the crucial syn-
thesis of this model of the constitution.79 In response to Parliament's list
of nineteen propositions for constitutional reform-including demands
for parliamentary control of the militia, parliamentary choice of royal
councillors and judges, and parliamentary participation in religious re-
form°---the King rejected these demands as contrary to the constitution:
There being three kindes of Government amongst men, Absolute Monar-
chy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, and all these having their particular con-
veniences and inconveniencies. The experience and wisdom of your
Ancestors hath so moulded this out of a mixture of these, as to give to this
Kingdom ... the conveniencies of all three, without the inconveniences of
any one, as long as the Balance hangs even between the three Estates, and
they run joyntly on in their proper Chanell. s
The "three estates" referred to were the King, the House of Lords, and
the House of Commons, which were easily analogized to the three kinds
78. Id. at 54-55, 234-35.
79. CORINNE WESTON, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS,
1556-1832, at 5-6 (1965). The fuller context of the importance of the Answer to the Nineteen Pro-
positions-that is, the relation of the idea of balanced government to what historians have called the
"Country" vision in Anglo-American politics-is ably summarized by Lance Banning in The Jeffer-
sonian Persuasion. Banning, supra note 14, at 22-25.
80. The Nineteen Propositions (June 1, 1642), reprinted in I SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY, supra note 51, at 489-91.
81. WESTON, supra note 79, at 263 (quoting Answer to the Nineteen Propositions).
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of government. The idea that there were three species of government,
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, each with its own particular vir-
tue and corresponding vice, and that the ideal constitution consisted of a
mixture of the three, is very old, traceable back to ancient political writ-
ers, including Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and especially Polybius. In its
modem incarnation, the idea of the three species of government also
came to be analogized to the functional division of powers of government
between the executive and legislative. In this model the King came to be
identified with the executive, the Commons with the legislative, and the
Lords as the bridge between the two; and thus, as Pocock has observed,
English constitutional theory was launched "on the slippery slope which
led from Polybius to Montesquieu."82
During the Interregnum, it had seemed that Parliament's victory in
the Civil War would be paralleled by the victory of the notion of parlia-
mentary sovereignty on the battlefields of theory. When, at his trial,
Charles I challenged the authority of the High Court of Justice,13 he was
historically correct; yet the challenge was moot because, as Charles him-
self dryly recognized, he was before "a power"-a power that had be-
come "the supreme and highest authority in England.""4 That power,
though in theory unlimited, was constrained nevertheless. The trial and
execution of Charles I marked one of the two extreme extensions of the
notion of parliamentary sovereignty; the other, the so-called Glorious
Revolution of 1688, ended with the deposition of James II and the acces-
sion of William and Mary. Between the two events, during the Com-
monwealth and the Restoration periods, the persistent, reassuring
concept of the ancient "mixed," or "balanced," constitution provided a
stable point of reference for all sides in the continuing constitutional
struggles-whether between the Parliament and the Army prior to Oli-
ver Cromwell's assumption of sovereignty as the Protector, or between
the Parliament and the King after the monarchy had been restored with
the accession of Charles II.
Consider, for example, the debate that led to the Exclusion Crisis late
in the reign of Charles II. Between 1678 and 1683, the last five years of
82. J.G.A. POCOCK, Machiavelli, Harrington, and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth
Century, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME, supra note 61, at 104, 131. The balanced government
model should be distinguished from the pure separation of powers model. See generally M.J.C.
VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967).
83. See CICELY V. WEDGWooD, A COFFIN FOR KING CHARLES: THE TRIAL AND EXEcU.
TION OF CHARLES I, at 150-52, 159, 165 (1964).
84. Id. at 163, 165.
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Charles's reign, there arose, under the leadership of Anthony Ashley
Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury, an opposition political party that posed
serious problems for the King and for his minister, Danby. These "First
Whigs" united around professed principles, including: A constitutional
and Protestant monarchy; the exclusion of the King's Catholic brother
James, the Duke of York, from the line of succession to the crown; and
an anti-French and anti-Catholic foreign policy. Using his party
machine to spread religious hysteria, Shaftesbury sought to overthrow
Danby, defeat the court or "Tory" party, force a Whig cabinet on the
King, and pass the Exclusion Bill barring the Duke of York from the
succession. Events unfolded rapidly in a high drama reminiscent of the
years prior to the Great Rebellion: Titus Oates and the fabricated "Po-
pish Plot," revelations of the King's secret negotiations for a French pen-
sion, the impeachment of Danby, the dissolution of Parliament, Whig
triumph in the parliamentary elections, the second dissolution of Parlia-
ment, and the arrest of Shaftesbury." s
It is important to note here, however, not the Whigs' program nor the
means by which they sought to implement it, but their constitutional
theory. Logically, the claims the Whig majority made in the second Ex-
clusion Parliament led to parliamentary sovereignty. Salus populi
suprema lex: if government existed to preserve the interests of the peo-
ple, if the sole criterion of those interests was the people's will, and if the
people's will were expressed by the House of Commons, then the House
of Commons must be the ultimate authority in the nation, to which the
other organs of the constitution must be subordinate. Yet, as an astute
scholar of this subject has observed, the Whigs never drew such a
deduction:
By no stretch of the imagination, however, could precedent be made to
countenance such a view of the constitution, and since the Whigs could not
emancipate themselves from precedent, they could never explicitly admit
that this was what they desired, and it must remain a matter of doubt to
what extent most of them consciously desired it.8 6
Like the Parliamentarians of the preceding generation, the Whigs found
themselves advocating one form of balanced constitution, what they re-
85. J.R. Jones has ably discussed the events of this period. See J.R. JONES, THE FIRST WHIGS:
THE POLITICS OF THE EXCLUSION CRISIS, 1678-1683 (1961). See also J.R. JONES, COUNTRY AND
COURT: ENGLAND, 1658-1714, at 197-216 (1979).
86, B. Behrens, The Whig Theory of the Constitution in the Reign of Charles 11, 7 CAMBRIDGE
HIST. J. 42, 50 (1941).
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ferred to as "mixed monarchy." The Tories, too, advocated "mixed
monarchy," but of course with a mixture compounded in different pro-
portions from that of the Whigs.87 Both sides thus assumed fundamental
law and a fixed constitution, under which powers were divided and bal-
anced; they differed only in defining the powers of each branch, and,
particularly, the prerogative powers of the King.
Even after 1688, when the constitutional form of the new "limited
monarchy"-and with it, one may argue, parliamentary sovereignty-
had been fully established, the prevalent constitutional orthodoxy was
that of the "mixed constitution" of three estates joined in a fine balance,
the "King in Parliament." This orthodoxy masked the role of legislation
in unprecedented constitutional development, as was illustrated by the
Bill of Rights of 1689.
Although many historians have viewed this document as an essentially
conservative restoration of certain rights that James II had assaulted
(such as the power of Parliament to levy taxes), at least one historian has
viewed it as "essentially a radical document.""8 The title of the Bill itself
was "[a]n act declaring the fights and liberties of the subject and settling
the succession of the crown." 89 After enumerating various unconstitu-
tional acts undertaken by "the late King James II" and identifying the
circumstances that underlay the present constitutional settlement-
James II's "having abdicated the government," William of Orange's hav-
ing become "the glorious instrument for delivering this kingdom from
popery and arbitrary power" °--the Bill then enumerated the "ancient
rights and liberties" of the nation. It declared illegal the "pretended"
powers exercised by James II, including suspending or executing laws
without consent of Parliament, creating new ecclesiastical courts, levying
money without the grant of Parliament, prosecuting subjects for exercis-
ing their right to petition, and raising and keeping a standing army
within the kingdom in time of peace without the consent of Parliament. 91
The Bill also identified other "undoubted fights and liberties" in a series
of exhortatory phrases: parliamentary elections "ought to be free"; free-
dom of speech during parliamentary debate "ought not to be im-
87. Id. at 50-51.
88. Lois G. Schwoerer, The Bill of Rights: Epitome of the Revolution of 1688-89, in THREE
BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 224, 226 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980).
89. Bill of Rights, I William & Mary, st. 2, c. 2 (1689), reprinted in 2 SOURCES OF ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, supra note 51, at 599.
90. Id. at 600.
91. Id. at 601.
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peached"; excessive bail "ought not to be required," nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted; and "parliaments
ought to be held frequently. ' 92 William and Mary received the crown on
the implicit condition that they recognize and preserve these rights and
liberties, as "the true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties of the
people of this kingdom." 93 Yet in fact these were not old rights restored,
but "new laws changing the powers of the kingship." By the Bill of
Rights, then, "a new monarchy was created": "the Crown that William
of Orange accepted in 1689 was significantly different from the one for
which Charles I fought in the 1640s and to which Charles II was restored
in 1660." 94 The seventeenth-century struggle over the locus of sover-
eignty between King and Parliament was decisively resolved in favor of
the latter, although technically "King in Parliament" and not Parliament
alone was sovereign.
Although only a statute, and conceivably subject to repeal by later
Parliaments, the Bill of 1689, like the Petition of Right sixty years earlier,
suggested by its very terms a more fundamental limitation, not only on
the powers of the monarchy but also on the powers of Parliament. The
rights and liberties so declared "by authority of this present parliament
... shall stand, remain, and be the law of this realm forever," the docu-
ment declared.9" Certain rights and privileges, like Magna Carta, would
"have no 'Sovereign'," even if Parliament were omnipotent.96 And
although Parliament may be absolute, it could not be arbitrary; as James
Otis would later observe, it could not make two and two five.97 The
notion of parliamentary sovereignty thus was tempered with the notion
92. Id.
93. Id. at 602-603.
94. Schwoerer, supra note 88, at 228. Henry Horwitz reaches a different conclusion, arguing
that the settlement of 1688-89 did not fundamentally alter the "constitution" since it "left intact the
royal prerogatives to make war and command the militia, to appoint to governmental posts, and to
summon, prorogue, and dissolve parliaments. Nor did [it] outlaw those devices by which Charles II
and James II had sought to alter the composition of parliament and to influence its members."
HENRY HORWITZ, PARLIAMENT, POLICY AND POLITICS IN THE REIGN OF WILLIAM III 13-14
(1977).
95. Bill of Rights, supra note 89, at 604.
96. CORWIN, supra note 46, at 54 (". . .'Sovereign Power' is no parliamentary word. In my
opinion it weakens Magna Charta, and all the statutes; for they are absolute without any saving of
'Sovereign Power.'.. . Magna Charta is such a fellow, that he will have no 'Sovereign.' ") (quoting
Coke's speech in 2 HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 356-57 (1628).
97. James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies (1764), in FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE
MAKING: READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 91, 95 (Alpheus T. Mason & Gordon E.
Baker eds., 4th ed. 1985).
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of sovereign power limited by self-review. Both notions, moreover, were
couched in the persistent, reassuring concept of the ancient "mixed," or
"balanced" constitution. Thus could complacent Englishmen of the
eighteenth century rest assured that the relative political stability and
economic prosperity of the period was undoubtedly associated with the
blessings of their constitution.
Two important lines of constitutional analysis remained, however, for
that minority of Englishmen who in the eighteenth century would dissent
from this prevailing attitude. First, they could utilize the persisting con-
cept of a higher, or fundamental law, which confined parliamentary au-
thority. The argument Parliamentarians employed during the reign of
Charles I-particularly to justify the Petition of Right of 1628-and that
the Whigs used in the late 1670s to support the Exclusion Bill would be
used by parliamentary reformers in the eighteenth century: that is, they
would appeal to the ancient constitution-even to a mythical Saxon, or
"Gothick," "original" constitution-in calling for change such as, for
example, more equal representation in the House of Commons. Thus did
the seventeenth-century idea of the ancient constitution develop into the
"Whig" history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the so-
called "Saxon myth" with which it would be associated.
The second line of analysis available to those who dissented involved
far more radical thinking. They would deny, or rather disregard, the
concept of the "ancient constitution" as fundamental law altogether and
rather turn to an alternate higher authority, reason. Those who did so
also moved the inquiry away from history, the common universe of dis-
course, to the new terrain of political theory, thereby resuming the devel-
opment of ideas that Hobbes and Filmer earlier had suggested.
Although, as noted above, the ideas of these proponents of unlimited
sovereignty won little acceptance among Englishmen in the seventeenth
century, their lasting significance lay in the responses they evoked from
John Locke and Algernon Sidney. Both men, like the authors they re-
futed, departed from a narrowly circumscribed fundamental law
analysis.
John Locke's intimate association with Anthony Ashley Cooper, the
first earl of Shaftesbury and the pivotal figure in the Exclusion Crisis late
in the reign of Charles II, allied Locke with the "first Whigs" just as
closely as the publication of his Two Treatises on Government in 1690
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allied him with the Glorious Revolution.98 Unlike the Whigs, however,
Locke was not faced with possibly inconsistent theories about mixed
monarchy because, in his arguments against the monarch's usurpation of
Parliament's powers, he utilized reason, not custom, as the fundamental
law that defined the constitution. Locke's famed Second Treatise posited
the origin of political, or civil, society in the compact by which men give
their consent to be governed-to give up their rights in the "state of na-
ture"-in order to secure their lives, liberties, and estates. The monarch
who exercises power he does not rightfully have is a usurper or a tyrant,
and thus violates the compact. The Lockean compact is not the tradi-
tional notion of the contract between the King and his subjects, which
was well established in English fundamental law thinking. It was, rather,
the new notion of the original social contract, which Locke posited at the
beginning of his Treatise-a notion, in short, that was relevant to natural
law, but not to constitutional law.99 In responding to the patriarchical
arguments of Filmer on these terms, Locke thereby moved the debate
altogether "out of the field in which history appears to be relevant. ' 'l""
Algernon Sidney, author of Discourses on Government (which, like
Locke's Treatises, was written to refute Filmer) and martyr to the cause
of liberty,' 0 ' was often spoken of together with Locke by Americans of
98. On the importance of Locke's association with Shaftesbury, see Peter Laslett, Introduction
to JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 25-37 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d
ed. 1698); MAURICE CRANSTON, JOHN LOCKE: A BIOGRAPHY 105-33 (1957).
Although the Second Treatise is still occasionally referred to as a justification of the Glorious
Revolution, the evidence strongly suggests that it was not so written. Peter Laslett has argued per-
suasively that Locke wrote the bulk of the Second Treatise during the winter of 1679-80, before he
had read Filmer's Patriarcha, which appeared in January 1680, and before he had written the First
Treatise, which is a detailed reply to Filmer's work. It thus appears that Locke wrote the Second
Treatise not as propaganda for a particular cause, but as a general refutation of absolute monarchy.
Laslett, supra.
99. John Phillip Reid has noted this important distinction. John P. Reid, The Irrelevance ofthe
Declaration, in LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 72-73
(Hendrick Hartog ed., 1981). The constitutional-law sense of contract, observes Reid, had been
utilized more than any other to limit royal power. It was "a practice of constitutionalism stretching
back beyond legal memory, to the pledge of King Canute to govern by the laws of Edgar, the prom-
ise of William the Conqueror to continue Anglo-Saxon customs, the coronation charter of Henry I,
and the several versions of Magna Carta." Id. It persisted up to the reign of William and Mary, one
may add, with the customary monarch's coronation oath and its reference to "ancient laws and
constitutions." See POCOCK, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 239.
100, POCOCK, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 237. See also Pocock, supra note 82,
at 144 (Locke "did not write or think within the changing framework of commonly accepted ideas
about the constitution .... ).
101. Sidney died on the block in 1683 for his real or supposed complicity in the Rye House Plot;
before his execution, he avowed that he died glorifying the "Old Cause," that is, of liberty against
Washington University Open Scholarship
160 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the Revolutionary generation. 102 Like Locke, Sidney went outside the
realm of history and custom to challenge Filmer's ideas about monarchi-
cal power, although it is debatable whether Sidney went farther than, or
not quite as far as, Locke. There appeared to be no place in Sidney's
argument for the idea of fundamental law as generally understood in the
late seventeenth century. To Sidney, history was a process of change.
It might as well be inferred that it is unlawful for us to build, clothe, arm,
defend or nourish ourselves otherwise than as our first parents did.., as to
take from us the liberty of instituting governments that were not known to
them .... The authority of custom as well as of law.., consists only in its
rectitude .... We are not so much to enquire after that which is ancient as
that which is best, and most conducing to the good ends to which it was
directed. 103
Yet after thus unequivocally stating that what mattered was whether a
government was good or evil, not whether it was old, Sidney added that
if that liberty in which God created man, can receive any strength from
continuance, and the rights of Englishmen can be rendered any more un-
questionable by prescription, [then it is worth noting] that the nations,
whose rights we inherit, have ever enjoyed the liberties we claim, and al-
ways exercised them in governing themselves.., from the time they were
first known in the world.1 4
tyrants. Locke's fear of arrest and possible execution, for his own "scandalous" or treasonable writ-
ings, prompted him to leave England, not returning until after the Revolution in 1689. See Laslett,
supra note 98, at 32, 66; CRANSTON, supra note 98, at 227-29, 246-57.
102. Thomas Jefferson, for example, invariably mentioned Sidney's Discourses and Locke's Sec-
ond Treatise together. See, eg., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Robert Skipwith (Aug, 3 1771),
reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 79 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell (June 14, 1807), reprinted in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON, supra note 1, at 415, 416; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), reprinted
in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 1, at 408. In the 1825 letter to Lee, Jefferson
mentioned Sidney and Locke together among the "elementary books of public right" that helped
shape the "harmonizing sentiments" of American Whig Revolutionaries in 1776. Jefferson to Henry
Lee, supra at 409. An 1825 resolution of the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia ex-
pressed the Board's opinion that
as to the general principles of liberty and the rights of man, in nature and in society, the
doctrines of Locke, in his "Essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil gov-
ernment," and of Sidney in his "Discourses on government," may be considered as those
generally approved by our fellow citizens of this, and the United States.
Minutes of the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia (Mar. 4, 1825), reprinted in 19 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 460-61 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1905).
103. ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 82, 332 (London 1704),
quoted in Behrens, supra note 86, at 65-66.
104. ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 380 (3d ed. London 1751),
quoted in POCOCK, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 238.
[Vol. 70:131
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/5
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
At the end of the seventeenth century, therefore, a significant underly-
ing tension, or contradiction, existed in English constitutionalism. The
concept of immemorial custom, expressed through the common law, as a
higher or fundamental law binding on both King and community, was in
decay; ideas of sovereignty had undermined it, in practice if not in the-
ory. The modem English conception of the "flexible" constitution, con-
sisting not of laws but "conventions," however, had not yet been fully
articulated; 105 Blackstone had not yet written his Commentaries on the
Laws of England, which would affirm parliamentary sovereignty. 106 In
the eighteenth century, then, those situated outside the established or-
der-whether English Dissenters, Anglo-Irishmen, or Americans-could
appeal against its practice by reference to "somewhat remotely perceived
principles," and thus could utilize arguments based both on history or
custom and on new ideas about reason and natural law.'07 To such dis-
senting voices, the arguments of Locke and Sidney would have special
importance.
III. VOICES OF DISSENT: THREE GENERATIONS OF "REAL WHIGS"
The term "Whig," as used in eighteenth-century Britain, referred to
the dominant political party, if one may call it a "party." Rather than
being organized as a party in the modem sense, the Whigs consisted
largely of a network of personal groups contending for power among
themselves, kept together by friendship and patronage rather than poli-
cies and principles. "Whig" was originally an abusive term, denoting
Scottish horse drovers and connoting a country bumpkin or yokel. It
had been applied to Scottish Presbyterian rebels in the mid-seventeenth
century and was first applied as a party name, again abusively, to the
"country party" under Shaftesbury, the Petitioners of 1679.108 The Glo-
rious Revolution of 1688 was primarily their triumph, and the Whig
Junto formed a powerful group in the reigns of William III and Anne.
United in opposition to the Jacobites, the Whigs secured the Hanoverian
succession and, because the Tories were suspected of disloyalty, enjoyed
a monopoly of power until the reign of George III.
105. On the English conception of the flexible constitution and eighteenth-century American
expressions of it, see Grey, supra note 33, at 866-67 n.102.
106. Blackstone's affirmation of parliamentary sovereignty is discussed in Part V, infra.
107. Pocock, supra note 82, at 144.
108. STEINBERG'S DICTIONARY OF BRITISH HISTORY 403 (S.H. Steinberg & I.H Evans eds., 2d
ed. 1970).
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Caroline Robbins has described three generations of "Com-
monwealthmen," or, as they liked to call themselves, "Real Whigs." The
Commonwealthmen were a small faction of politically conscious Britons
in the Augustan age, representing a small minority among the many
Whigs.1" 9 The "Commonwealthmen" referred to themselves as "Real
Whigs" to avow a consciousness of kinship with civil-war-period republi-
can political writers, such as Milton, Harrington, and Sidney. As Rob-
bins notes, such a claimed connection sharply distinguished them from
their contemporaries in the mainstream of British political discourse.
In the eighteenth century the majority of the ruling oligarchy and the
greater part of their fellow countrymen emphatically denied any continuity
or connection between the innovators and Levellers of the Puritan Revolu-
tion (1641-1660), and the philosophers and Whiggish statesmen of the
struggle (1679-1710) to exclude James Stuart and secure the Glorious
Revolution. An eccentric antiquarian might hang a copy of Charles the
First's execution writ in his closet and speak alarmingly of kings and super-
stitions, but in general all talk of '41 alarmed Englishmen as much or more
than the sight of Jacobite toasts over the water. Any proposed tampering
with the fabric of the church and state produced dismal recollections and
dire predictions. 110
Hence the "Real Whigs"-quite literally "eccentric antiquarians"-can
be credited with no consequential achievements in England. "English
development," Robbins notes, "shows scarcely a trace of [the Real
Whigs'] efforts to restore or amend the mixed or Gothic government they
esteemed." ' Their importance lies in their maintenance of the revolu-
tionary tradition in English political thought and, through their influence
on Americans in the mid-eighteenth century, the linking of the history of
English struggles against tyranny in one century with the American ef-
fort for independence in another.1 12
Although those whom Robbins has described as "Real Whigs" were
many different individuals of three distinct generations, they generally
held certain ideas in common. First, the Real Whigs viewed with alarm
the development of Cabinet government, seeing the possibility of ministe-
rial predominance as a threat to the balance of the constitution. They
109. RoBBINS, supra note 6, at 3. These persons also used the terms "Independent Whig,"
"True Whig," and "Honest Whig" to describe themselves, but for the sake of consistency, "Real
Whig" is used here.
110. Id.
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believed in a separation of powers and hoped that each part of the gov-
ernment would check or balance the others; accordingly, they wished to
separate legislative and executive branches more completely, and they
roundly condemned special interests-placemen, party cliques and ca-
bals-in government. '13 Second, throughout the century Real Whigs
urged the reform of Parliament by a wider franchise and a more equita-
ble distribution of seats. They also advocated more frequent elections-
in fact, annual parliaments. 1 '4 Third, the Real Whigs were vigorous
champions of religious liberty. In tracts, sermons, and treatises they kept
alive "[t]he idea of a state in which no one was more privileged than
another because of his religion nor in any way penalized for his lack of
orthodoxy." '115 The Real Whigs were very early advocates, Robbins
notes, of "a tolerance which went far beyond the theories of Locke or
Milton," including within its scope Jews, atheists, Unitarians, Moham-
medans, and, by Jdseph Priestley's time, even "well-behaved
Catholics."I 16 These friends to religious liberty also more broadly cham-
pioned freedom of inquiry through secularized education. 17 Finally, the
Real Whigs expanded the concept of consent in two significant respects.
They argued, first, that every Englishman-wherever he was, at home or
abroad-was entitled to be ruled by laws to which he himself had con-
sented, and second, that this right of Englishmen extended to all
mankind. 1
The first generation of Real Whigs Robbins described appeared not
long after the Glorious Revolution, and most of its members were dead
by 1727. The Revolution of 1688, Robbins notes, "made respectable
eventually a large body of republican or Commonwealth writers" of the
seventeenth century, including Harrington, Nedham, Milton, Ludlow,
Neville, Marvell, Locke, and Sidney. 19 As an immediate result of the
Glorious Revolution, however, most Whigs moderated, relishing the
"glory" of the constitutional settlement of 1689 that put William and
Mary on the throne and reaffirmed the rights of Englishmen. Most
Whigs "believed that they had an almost perfect constitution defined by
the Bill of Rights, the Statute of Habeas Corpus, the Toleration, and the
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id. at 9.
115. Id. at 11.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 12-13.
118. Id. at 9.
119. Id. at 58.
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Union.""12 They spoke of the excellence of the English system and of the
folly of even minor alterations to it. They concentrated instead on em-
pire, economic stability, prosperity, and administration. 121 Yet the men
who in time would describe themselves as "Real Whigs" were not as
content.
Beginning with the appearance of Robert Molesworth's Account of
Denmark in 1693 and continuing through the publication of the last of
John Trenchard's and Thomas Gordon's Cato's Letters in 1723, the first
generation of Real Whigs agitated for reform that went further than that
offered by the Bill of Rights and the Toleration Act. These reformers
were found in dissenters' meetings and in certain country houses and
taverns. Molesworth was a leading figure; among the Real Whigs of this
period were the third Earl of Shaftesbury, a self-declared disciple of
Molesworth, as well as a number of Molesworth's friends or acquaint-
ances, including William Molyneux, author of The Case of Ireland, and
the Scotsman, Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun.122 As Robbins has summa-
rized their reform efforts, "[t]hey worked for a federal system in the Brit-
ish Isles, an amendment of parliament, a diminution of ministerial
prerogative, an increased toleration, and some modification of mercantil-
ist regulations." 12 3 But the Real Whigs of this period received no sup-
port or encouragement from Whigs in office, and the legislative successes
they could claim were modest. But, Robbins notes, their "real achieve-
ment" lay in the intellectual nourishment they gave to a second genera-
tion of Commonwealthmen who not only would read the "arguments"
and "essays" of the first Real Whigs but also would continue to study the
seventeenth-century works that they strove to have republished. 24
The second generation Robbins described was roughly contemporane-
ous with the reign of George 11 (1727-1760) and the ministry of Robert
Walpole. Dissenters from the Augustan calm, the Real Whigs of this
period consisted of religious nonconformists and political opposition
writers: men such as Henry Grove, the teacher and scholar who contrib-
uted to Spectator; James Foster, the preacher and contributor to The Old
Whig; the hymnologist Isaac Watts; Edmund Law, a leading figure
120. Id. at 86-87.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 91-98. For Robbins' summaries of Molyneux and Fletcher, see id. at 137-43, 180-84,
respectively.
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among the liberal Anglicans at Cambridge; and Thomas Pownall, author
of the 1752 treatise Principles of Polity.12 Associated in an "uneasy"
alliance with dissident Tories such as Henry St. John, Viscount Boling-
broke (1678-1751), the Real Whig opponents of the Walpole administra-
tion became the spokesmen for what historians generally refer to as the
"Country" opposition.126
Bolingbroke and others of his "circle"-men of letters such as
Jonathan Swift, Alexander Pope, and John Gay-employed what Isaac
Kramnick has called "the politics of nostalgia."' 27 England in the open-
ing decades of the eighteenth century was undergoing a "financial revolu-
tion," brought about by the establishment of the Bank of England, the
growth of the national debt, and the rise of joint-stock companies such as
the East India Company and the South Sea Company. New ways to
wealth and political power were made available to those who exploited
the opportunities created by these new institutions, while many of the
landed gentry-the older elite-were in noticeable decline. Having
borne the expense of King William's wars, the gentry found themselves
in debt, their estates in decay, and "new men" filling their former places
of prestige. The financial revolution was "the most meaningful social
experience in the lives of Bolingbroke and others in his circle"; it in-
formed all their writings on politics and society, and it fed "their gloom,
their satire, and their indignation." 128
Bolingbroke, the Real Whigs, and other members of the opposition
party were not simply a coalition of "outs"-independent Tories, dissi-
dent Whigs, small merchants and traders-held together in loose coali-
tion by no set of ideas or ideology; rather, they shared a particular set of
ideas, a political "style." Bolingbroke had inherited from his humanist
predecessors a "high public style," a view of statecraft in tune with the
125. See generally id. at 221-319.
126. Id. at 274. Robbins deliberately excluded Bolingbroke from her original study, noting that
although Bolingbroke could "cite the canonical Whig writers in defense of his own devious ways,"
id. at 295, he--like the other Tory, David Hume-never completely accepted the logical defense for
the Glorious Revolution. Id. at 8. Responding to Isaac Kramnick and other critics, Robbins has
defended the omission of Bolingbroke by arguing that he, unlike the eighteenth-century Com-
monwealthmen, had "no interest" in continuing reform of the constitution. CAROLINE ROBBINS,
THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY COMMONWEALTHMAN at x-xi (1968) (forward to reprint ed.).
127. ISAAC KRAMNICK, BOLINGaROKE AND His CIRCLE: THE POLITICS OF NOSTALGIA IN THE
AGE OF WALPOLE (1968).
128. Id. at 4, 39-69.
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civic republican tradition that J.G.A. Pocock has described.129 However
much that political style might differ from the "Whig canon" Robbins
described, Bolingbroke was at one with the Real Whigs in his emphasis
on the jealous spirit of liberty: "liberty cannot be long secure, in any
country, unless a perpetual jealousy watches over it" because, "in the
nature of things, the notion of a perpetual danger to liberty is inseparable
from the very notion of government."13 Bolingbroke and his circle also
shared with the Real Whigs an abhorrence of the Walpole ministry's
"corruption" of the English constitution.
"Corruption," as used by the Country opposition in the 1720s and
1730s, denoted a disturbance of the balance of the constitution through
the Crown's "influence" over Parliament. The "Country" vision, as
Pocock has summarized, assumed that governmental power would be
abused:
Society is made up of court and country; government, of court and Parlia-
ment; Parliament, of court and country members. The court is the adminis-
tration. The country consists of the men of independent property; all others
are servants. The business of Parliament is to preserve the independence of
property, on which is founded all human liberty and all human excellence.
The business of administration is to govern, and this is a legitimate activity;
but to govern is to wield power, and power has a natural tendency to en-
croach. It is more important to supervise government than to support it,
because the preservation of independence is the ultimate political good.131
The most effective structural mechanism for preventing this, the "Coun-
try" vision further assumed, was to guard against "corruption" and
thereby to maintain a balance among the parts of the "ancient
constitution":
There exists an ancient constitution in England, which consists in a balance
or equilibrium between the various organs of government, and within this
balance the function of Parliament is to supervise the executive. But the
executive possesses means of distracting Parliament from its proper func-
tion; it seduces members by the offer of places and pensions, by retaining
them to follow ministers and ministers' rivals, by persuading them to sup-
port measures-standing armies, national debts, excise schemes-whereby
the activities of administration grow beyond Parliament's control. These
129. See Pocock, supra note 82, at 104-47, for an introduction to the argument he more fully
developed in his study, The Machiavellian Moment. POCOCK, supra note 12.
130. BOLINGBROKE, Remarks on the History of England (1730), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF
LORD BOLINGBROKE 292, 295-96 (reprint ed. 1967) (London 1844).
131. Pocock, supra note 82, at 124-25.
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means of subversion are known collectively as corruption, and if ever Par-
liament or those who elect them-for corruption can occur at this point
too-should be wholly corrupt, then there will be an end of independence
and liberty. The remedy for corruption is to expel placemen, to ensure that
members of Parliament become in no way entangled in the pursuit of power
or the exercise of administration, and to see to it that parliaments are fre-
quently elected by uncorrupted voters.1 32
Hence, for example, the standing army is an instrument of corruption,
and to defend the militia against a standing army is the same as to defend
Parliament against corruption.1 33
By combining control of the House of Commons with the confidence
of the King, Walpole had become one of the most powerful British prime
ministers. He had put into practice a rigorously articulated system of
influence, using the Crown's tremendous power of patronage to create a
Treasury Party and, with its dominance, reliable support for his ministry
and the basis for the political stability of England. This system was nec-
essarily "corrupt" because, in "Country" theory, the balance of the con-
stitution depended on the complete separation of Parliament and
administration. As Pocock summarizes the argument, "[ilt was for the
Crown to govern, and for Parliament to exercise a jealous surveillance of
government; 'corruption' would follow if the Crown discovered any
means at all of attaching members of Parliament to it in the pursuit of its
business." 134 The Real Whigs, as "Country" members of Parliament,
therefore saw it as their special duty to exercise that "Right of examining
all publick Measures" that they had claimed for themselves. 1 35 Indeed,
one self-styled "Real Whig," William Talbot, defined Whiggery in terms
of the concern over corruption and the need for eternal vigilance to
guard against it:
The principles of a Real Whig, in my sense of the term are these, that gov-
ernment is an original compact between the governors and the governed,
instituted for the good of the whole community; that in a limited monarchy,
or more properly legal commonwealth, the majesty is in the people and tho'
the person on the throne is superior to any individual, he is the servant of
the nation; -that the only title to the crown is the election of the people;
that the laws are equally obligatory to the Prince and people; that as the
constitution of England is formed of three legislative branches, the balance
132. Id. at 125.
133. Id. at 125-26.
134. Id. at 131-32.
135. See infra text accompanying note 264.
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between each must be preserved, to prevent the destruction of the whole; -
that elections ought to be free, the elected independent; -that a Parliamen-
tary influence by places and pensions is inconsistent with the interest of the
public; and that a Minister who endeavours to govern by corruption, is
guilty of the vilest attempt to subvert the constitution; -that a standing
mercenary army in time of peace is contrary to the laws, dangerous to the
liberties, and oppressive to the subjects of Great Britain; ... that our pros-
perity depends on trade, which it is our interest to encourage, our duty to
protect; -that our colonies are the foundation of a very beneficial com-
merce; that honour, justice, and policy oblige us to defend them; that our
navigation is not to be interrupted, or our merchants plundered with impu-
nity to those who insult us; -that all unappropriated subsidies and votes of
confidence are dangerous precedents, and always to be opposed; unless so
apparent exigencies of affairs evidently and absolutely require such ex-
traordinary and unconstitutional measures; -that the freedom of the press
is the bulwark of religious and civil liberty; that as religion is of the utmost
importance to every man, no person ought to suffer civil hardships for his
religious persuasion, unless the tenets of his religion lead him to endeavour
at the subversion of the establishment in Church or State.136
Walpole and the "Court" apologists, like the "Country" opposition,
were firmly committed to the ideal of the mixed constitution and the
balance of the three branches of the legislature, the ideal that dominated
eighteenth-century English constitutionalism. They actually defended
the very corruption the "Country" opposition denounced, arguing that
without it, the constitution would not function properly. The Commons
had acquired too much power, thereby creating a constitutional imbal-
ance, Walpole and the "Court" apologists argued; only through the
Crown's disposal of places in the civil, military, and ecclesiastical estab-
lishment could the monarch hold his place in the constitutional balance.
Thus, as Pocock observes, both sides in the eighteenth-century constitu-
tional debate-Court as well as Country-believed that the constitution
consisted in the balance maintained between its parts. They disagreed
about how to preserve the balance:
[B]ut the 'Country' theory maintained that the balance was to be preserved
by preserving the parts in independence of each other, while the 'Court'
apologists-nearer as they usually were to constitutional reality-con-
tended that the balance was between parts that were interdependent and
136. Letter written by William Talbot (1734), quoted in ROBBINS, supra note 6, at 283.
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must be preserved by keeping the interdependence properly adjusted.1 37
Both schools of thought, Pocock adds, were true to the notion (de-
rived, he argues, through Harrington from Machiavelli) that a return to
the first principles, or original balance, of the constitution would deal
with corruption. But the Country pamphleteers, who usually could be
found insisting that there was corruption and that it ought to be re-
formed forthwith, were "responsible for importing into eighteenth-cen-
tury thought the notion that the basic principles of the constitution-
held to consist of some kind of balance or separation of powers-were
known, as well as ancient, and that recourse could and should be made to
them whenever there was need." 138 Thus the Real Whigs of the second
generation, who together with Bolingbroke and certain other Tory dissi-
dents comprised the "Country" party of the early decades of the century,
kept alive into the eighteenth century the notion of the ancient constitu-
tion that Coke and others had promulgated over a century earlier.
Within a few decades, however, a noticeable change occurred in Real
Whig constitutional thought. The third and last generation of Real
Whigs whom Robbins identified, those of the reign of George III, were
persons of science and letters such as the eminent Dr. Joseph Priestley
and the jurist and Oriental scholar, Sir William Jones; liberal Anglican
churchmen such as Jonathan Shipley, Bishop of Asaph and a close friend
of Dr. Benjamin Franklin; and advocates of parliamentary reform such
as Major John Cartwright, Dr. John Jebb, and fellow associates of the
Society for Constitutional Information.139 These "Honest Whigs" of the
1760s and 1770s are often called early "Radicals" because their thor-
ough-going advocacy of constitutional reform made them ideological
kinsmen of the American revolutionaries as well as, within a few de-
cades, the French revolutionaries. 14 0
Five of these leading Radical political thinkers are especially impor-
tant because they publicly addressed the American question during the
137. Pocock, supra note 82, at 132. See also KRAMNICK, supra note 127, at 111-12, 122-23, 135-
36; VILE, supra note 82, at 54, 72-74.
138, Pocock, supra note 82, at 132. Pocock distinguishes the eighteenth-century "neo-Har-
ringtonians" from James Harrington himself because, while Harrington dismissed medieval politics
as incoherent and saw his commonwealth of freeholders as coming into existence only after 1485, the
neo-Harringtonians identified it with the ancient constitution. Id. at 135.
139. See generally ROBBINS, supra note 6, at 320-77.
140. ROBBINS, supra note 6, at 7, 320-21. See also ROBERT E. TOOHEY, LIBERTY & EMPIRE:
BRITISH RADICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN PROBLEM, 1774-1776, at xii (1978). Toohey's
study provides an excellent introduction to the thought of these "British Radicals."
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two critical years between the Boston Tea Party and the Declaration of
Independence. 141
James Burgh (1714-1775) spent the last years of his life completing his
most important political work, Political Disquisitions.'42 This three-vol-
ume treatise was a classic statement of Real Whig opinion; Robbins sug-
gests that it was "the most important political treatise which appeared in
England in the first half of the reign of George III. ' ' 143 It was also tre-
mendously influential in America; Bernard Bailyn has called it "the key
book of this generation.""
Burgh's neighbor and friend, Richard Price (1723-1791), was an ac-
complished moral philosopher, political theorist, and actuarial statisti-
cian, as well as one of the most prominent Dissenting clergymen in
England. One of the first and best-known Honest Whigs regularly at-
tending informal social gatherings at London coffeehouses in the 1760s
and 1770s, he also was one of Benjamin Franklin's closest friends during
Dr. Franklin's long residence in England. Price's Observations on the
Nature of Civil Liberty,1 45 which appeared early in 1776, won broad at-
tention on both sides of the Atlantic.
Adamant in his opposition to the war with America, Price continued
to correspond with his American friends and even, when he could,
passed on valuable information about affairs in England. Although cir-
cumstances forced him to decline the invitation Congress issued in au-
tumn 1778 to come to America as a citizen and as fiscal consultant to
Congress, his ties to America remained strong. The American Academy
of Arts and Sciences made Price a fellow in 1782; a few years later, he
was elected to membership in the American Philosophical Society. As
one historian has observed, "[flew Englishmen welcomed the success of
the American Revolution and the birth of the Republic as did Price,"
who on New Year's Day 1783 wrote to Dr. Benjamin Rush in Philadel-
phia of his heartfelt belief that the American Revolution was "one of the
most important revolutions that has ever taken place in the world," one
141. TOOHEY, supra note 140, at 24-25 (referring to James Burgh, Richard Price, Catharine
Macaulay, Granville Sharp, and John Cartwright). Much of the discussion in the following several
paragraphs draws on the biographical information summarized in Toohey's useful synthesis of the
lives and contributions of these five individuals.
142. JAMES BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS (1774-75).
143. ROBBINS, supra note 6, at 365.
144. BAILYN, supra note 10, at 41.
145. RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES
OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA (1776).
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that would make "a new opening in human affairs" and introduce "more
light and liberty and virtue than have yet been known." '46 Price wrote
and thought extensively about the United States for the rest of his life.
The historian Catharine Macaulay (1731-1791) was an extraordinary
person, "one of the most celebrated females of her time, both in England
and America." 47 As a gifted propagandist for the cause of liberty, she
evoked strong opinions in her contemporaries: her writings sorely an-
noyed conservative Englishmen like Dr. Samuel Johnson, while the Sons
of Liberty toasted her in the taverns of Boston along with other pro-
American worthies such as Shelburne, Burke, and Wilkes. She is best
remembered for her eight-volume Whiggish History of England from the
Accession of James I to that of the Brunswich Line (1763-83), which she
wrote in response to David Hume's very popular History of England, and
its Tory-like treatment of the Stuart reigns.
Although he was not a Dissenter like Price and Burgh, Granville
Sharp had a life and career much like that of the many social reformers
who could be found among the Dissenters. Mainly remembered as "the
father of the anti-slavery movement" in eighteenth-century England, he
became a celebrity through his role in the Somerset case in 1771-72 when
he challenged prevailing legal opinions, including William Blackstone's,
before William Murray, Earl of Mansfield, who was Lord Chief Justice
of the Court of King's Bench.14 Defense of America was one of Sharp's
many other causes. His pamphlet, A Declaration of the People's Natural
Right to a Share in the Legislature,1 49 was another important contribu-
tion to the American debate as well as a revealing exposition of the Real
Whig views of consent and representation. Sharp took a leave of absence
and eventually resigned from his position in the government's Ordnance
Office because of his conscientious objection to the war with America.
He became one of Major Cartwright's companions in the cause of parlia-
146. TOOHEY, supra note 140, at 166.
147. Id. at 34.
148. James Somerset was a slave, brought by his master to England from Virginia, who had
deserted his master, was recaptured in England by his master's agents, and locked in chains aboard a
Jamaica-bound ship. Working with other anti-slavery activists who sought to free Somerset by ob-
taining a writ of habeas corpus, Sharp contended that "as soon as any slave sets his foot upon
English territory, he becomes free." Judge Mansfield's favorable decision was popularly interpreted
as outlawing slavery in England. The legal issues involved in the Somerset case, and particularly
Sharp's interesting correspondence with Blackstone, is discussed more fully in DAVID B. DAVIS,
THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823, at 480-86 (1975).
149. GRANVILLE SHARP, A DECLARATION OF THE PEOPLE'S NATURAL RIGHT TO A SHARE IN
THE LEGISLATURE (1774).
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mentary reform and was a charter member in the Society for Constitu-
tional Information.
John Cartwright (1740-1824), usually known in the history of English
reformism as Major Cartwright, devoted most of his long life to the ad-
vocacy of parliamentary reform. The American crisis helped convert
him to this career. His first political tract, American Independence the
Interest and Glory of Great Britain,150 consisted of a series of essays that
began with a denial of Parliament's authority to legislate for the colonies.
Foreseeing that a bitterness and hostility inimical to the interests of both
America and Britain likely would accompany the separation of the colo-
nies, Cartwright urged in the tenth and last essay a proposal to effect a
mutually beneficial separation. 51
Like Granville Sharp, Cartwright was forced to leave a government
career because of his principled opposition to the war with America.
Still in the Royal Navy at the outset of the war, Cartwright refused a
personal request from his old commander, Lord Admiral Howe, to serve
on the admiral's staff in the coming naval campaign off the coast of
North America. He instead accepted an appointment as major in the
militia of Nottinghamshire, where he held on to his father's estate. Thus
Cartwright combined his farming and militia duties with his crusade for
parliamentary reform. He joined with Sharp, Dr. John Jebb, and others
in founding the Society for Constitutional Information in 1780.
These radicals of the later eighteenth century, Isaac Kramnick has ob-
served, were
much more likely to base their arguments on natural rights than on histori-
cal rights; they were preoccupied less with nostalgic country concerns than
with very modem socioeconomic grievances. They shared a deeply felt
sense that the unreformed British constitution failed to serve the interests of
the talented and hard-working middle class.1 52
Kramnick points to the 1760s as "the crucial turning point." Two great
historical developments-the American crisis and the Industrial Revolu-
tion-changed the context of ideological discourse, especially among the
Real Whigs. The American crisis and the accompanying controversy
over taxation introduced into politics "new noncountry issues," primar-
150. JOHN CARTWRIGHT, AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE THE INTEREST AND GLORY OF GREAT
BRITAIN (1774), reprinted in English Defenders of American Freedoms, 1774-1778, at 133-91 (Paul
H. Smith ed., 1972).
151. Id. at 182-88.
152. Kramnick, Republican Revisionism, supra note 20, at 635.
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ily the issue of representation, which "extend[ed] 'the debate about par-
liamentary reform far beyond its previous confines.' "153 The emergence
of a new middle-class radicalism during the early years of the Industrial
Revolution transformed the old civic republican notions of virtue and
corruption and thereby dramatically altered the paradigms that underlay
political discourse. Economic productivity and hard work replaced citi-
zenship and the public quest for the common good as the criteria of vir-
tue; "[s]elf-centered economic productivity, not public citizenship,
became the badge of the virtuous man." ' And when middle-class radi-
cals inveighed against corrupt patronage, it was a new sense of corrup-
tion: "the corruption of jobs and places going to undeserving, untalented
men of birth." '155
After the 1760s, Kramnick argues, "the concerns of the earlier part of
the century-the mixed constitution, annual Parliaments, the independ-
ent Commons, anti-place legislation, and the standing army contro-
versy-were shunted aside."1 56  Patronage and privilege were the
principles that still pitted the Court against the reformers, but the Court-
Country dichotomy that had arisen during the Financial Revolution of
the Walpole era became nearly transposed during the Industrial Revolu-
tion of the later decades of the century. By the 1760s and 1770s, the
Country reform tradition "came to terms with the market," while the
Court remained "enmeshed in the principle of patronage, which ulti-
mately flew in the face of market notions of careers neutrally open to
talent and hard work." 157 The views of the middle-class radical "outs"
reversed the earlier equation of Court and commerce: the "ins," the
Court and all it stood for, "were identified not with the market and with
commerce but with idle, unproductive privilege." '158 In this period the
privileged Court responded with a nostalgic defense of the ancient
constitution. 159
Adapting the ideas of the previous generations of Real Whigs to the
new political issues of the 1760s and 1770s, the Real Whigs of the third
153. Id. (quoting JOHN BREWER, PARTY IDEOLOGY AND POPULAR POLITICS AT THE AccEs-
SION OF GEORGE III, at 255 (1977)).
154. Id. at 661.
155. Id. at 662. See also Isaac Kramnick, English Middle Class Radicalism in the Eighteenth
Century, in 3 LITERATURE OF LIBERTY 3 (1980).
156. Kramnick, Republican Revisionism, supra note 20, at 635.
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generation ensured the lasting significance of those ideas by injecting
them into a trans-Atlantic dialogue. As Robert Toohey has shown, these
British radicals "were the strongest ideological connection which the
leadership of the American Revolution possessed in the European world
of the late eighteenth century." 16° Americans and British Real Whigs
were
sources of inspiration to one another.... They read each other's writings
and their common heritage enabled them to enjoy a mutual satisfaction.
Both groups honored the constitution and the liberties of England while
seeking to realize human freedom on a new and larger scale. They believed
that the imperial crisis resulted from political conditions in England which
were eroding liberty in both the colonies and the mother country.161
At the outset of the American Revolution, British Radicals who viewed
the imperial questions of 1774-76 in this light and who "recognized that
the American problem demanded innovative solutions which complacent
Englishmen were unable to accept [represented] the most advanced
thinking in England on the subject of empire."1 62 At the same time, they
inaugurated a parliamentary reform movement that anticipated one of
the most important chapters in English constitutional development in the
next century. 1
63
IV. THE SUBSTANCE OF WHIG CONSTITUTIONALISM
At the heart of Whig constitutionalism were two related assumptions:
first, that the essential function of government was to protect the rights
of individuals; and second, that the essential function of a constitution
was to limit or control governmental power, which-almost paradoxi-
cally-had the inevitable tendency to threaten the individual rights that
government was instituted to protect. Both assumptions permeated the
writings of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English radical Whigs.
The second assumption (rooted in the classic Whig fear of abuse of polit-
ical power) was explicit in virtually all Whig writings. The first assump-
tion, however, while implicit in many seventeenth-century writings, did
160. TOOHEY, supra note 140, at 154-55.
161. Id. For additional discussion of the influence of British radical Whigs on colonial Ameri-
cans, see BAILYN, supra note 10, at 34-54. Indeed, Bailyn has argued that the radical Whigs shaped
the mind of the American Revolutionary generation "more than any other single group of writers."
Id. at 35.
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not become explicit until the Real Whigs of the mid-eighteenth century
used it in their arguments for constitutional reform.
The most important readings in shaping American Whig constitution-
alism in the crucial years prior to the Revolution may be divided into
three groups: "black-letter" texts of the common law, primarily the
works of Sir Edward Coke, Real Whig histories, and Real Whig political
tracts. As one reads these works, moving from the common law texts to
the histories, then from the histories to the political tracts, one sees a
progressively more comprehensive Whig constitutional theory. In other
words, the Whig argument for keeping a watchful eye on governmental
power broadened, as it shifted from law to history and from history to
philosophy: the common lawyers defended parliamentary rights against
the Stuart kings; the Whig historians defended the "rights of English-
men" against all "encroachments" of the Crown that followed the Nor-
man Conquest; and the Whig philosophers of government defended the
"natural rights of man" against all abuse of governmental power,
whether coming from the king or from Parliament. Each of these groups
of works, therefore, merits close examination.
A. "Black-Letter" Texts: The Whig Common-Law Tradition
Colonial Americans, lawyers and nonlawyers alike, repeatedly referred
to the great figures of England's legal history, especially the seventeenth-
century whig common lawyers. As Bernard Bailyn has observed, "Sir
Edward Coke is everywhere in the literature: 'Coke upon Littleton,' 'my
Lord Coke's Reports,' 'Lord Coke's 2nd Institute'-the citations are al-
most as frequent as, and occasionally even less precise than, those to
Locke, Montesquieu, and Voltaire.""' Other common-law writers casu-
ally referred to as authorities included the earlier commentators Bracton
and Fortescue as well as Coke's contemporary, Francis Bacon, and his
successors, Sir Matthew Hale, Sir John Vaughan, and Sir John Holt.
Considered together, these treatise writers provided colonial Americans
with a respect, indeed a veneration, for the common law, one that Bailyn
has argued was "manifestly influential in shaping the awareness of the
Revolutionary generation," even though the common law alone would
not determine the conclusions Americans would draw in times of
crisis. 165
164. BAILYN, supra note 10, at 30.
165. Id. at 31. As to the limitations of the common law, Bailyn explains, "[t]he law was no
science of what to do next," although it was "a repository of experience in human dealings embody-
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To Americans in the mid-eighteenth century, the single most impor-
tant legal treatise was not Blackstone's Commentaries, which was not
published until 1765, but rather Sir Edward Coke's A Commentary upon
Littleton,166 commonly referred to as simply Coke on Littleton, which
constituted the first of four parts of the Institutes of the Laws of England.
Coke wrote this difficult work in the form of a commentary, with a for-
midable mass of the author's criticism and learned notes heaped around
the text. In the preface, Coke forewarned the reader about "this pain-full
and large volume," with the complexity of its subject matter rendered
even more formidable by the difficult style that exasperated many emi-
nent American students of the law in the pre-Revolutionary era.1 67
Sir Thomas Littleton wrote the text Coke chose for his commentary
some time in the 1470s for the instruction of his son Richard. It was a
brief, black-letter treatise on the land law, describing the customs that
since time out of mind had surrounded the ownership and inheritance of
English real property-a matter of the first importance in colonial
America as well as in England. Coke's English translation of the text
began with Littleton's definition of the most important of the estates in
land at common law, the fee simple:
Tenant in fee-simple is he which hath lands or tenements to hold to him
and his heires for ever. And it is called in Latin, feodum simplex, for fe-
odum is the same that inheritance is, and simplex is as much as to say,
lawfull or pure; and so feodum simplex signifies a lawfull or pure
ing the principles of justice, equity, and rights." Id. The common-law writers, ideologically speak-
ing, helped lay the groundwork for the Whig historians and philosophers of government. These
latter two groups, discussed infra, more directly helped the Americans formulate constitutional ar-
guments in the crisis years of 1774-76. In other words, history and philosophy together supple-
mented the common law, in helping the Americans eventually justify independence.
166. EDWARD COKE, COKE ON LrTrLETON (1651).
167. Struggling in the winter of 1762 with this crabbed treatise, Thomas Jefferson exclaimed to
his old college chum, John Page, "I do wish the Devil had old Cooke, for I am sure I never was so
tired of an old dull scoundrel in my life." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Page (Dec. 25,
1762), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 102, at 5. Jefferson's exasper-
ation was typical; contemporaries such as John Adams, whose legal mentor, Jeremiah Gridley, had
directed him to read Coke, shared the sense of profound discouragement this book engendered. As
Dumas Malone has observed, "[tihe technical study of the law was then a 'dreary ramble,' as John
Adams said, for books that smoothed the student's path did not exist. Textbooks of the modem sort
were unknown, and Blackstone's famous Commentaries had not yet appeared." DUMAS MALONE,
JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 69-70 (1948). Other eminent American students who complained in-
cluded Daniel Webster, who said that study of the book caused him to "dispair and almost to give up
law for school teaching," and Joseph Story, who claimed that his struggle as a young man to com-
prehend Coke-Littleton actually drove him to tears. See BOWEN, supra note 66, at 513.
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inheritance. 168
Coke's commentary on the text took the form of an almost word-for-
word exegesis, for he deemed Littleton's every phrase worthy of com-
ment and exposition. "Certain it is," says Coke, "that there is never a
period, nor (for the most part) a word, nor an &c but affordeth excellent
matter of learning."
169
The substantive content of other areas of English law was the subject
of the three other volumes of Coke's Institutes. The second volume, or
"part," as Coke entitled it, was a commentary on Magna Carta and some
thirty-eight other important charters and statutes of the realm. Coke
considered Magna Carta as "no new declaration," but rather as a reaffir-
mation of "the principall grounds of the fundamentall laws of Eng-
land."'7 0 The implications of Coke's interpretation were clear: the
rights guaranteed by Magna Carta owed their origin to the ancient com-
mon law, not to a gracious royal concession. Thus Coke's interpretation,
not surprisingly, asserted the supremacy of common law over royal
prerogative.
Typical of the tone of the second Institute was Coke's exposition of the
famous thirty-ninth clause of Magna Carta: "No free man shall be taken
or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs,
or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed,... but by lawful
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land." "Upon this chapter,"
says Coke, "as out of a roote, many fruitfull branches of the law of Eng-
168. COKE, supra note 166, at *la.
169. Id. at *xxxvii. Thus, in the notes in a column adjoining Littleton's definition of fee simple,
Coke noted that the word tenant is derived from the verb teneo, "and hath in the law five significa-
tions." Id. at *la. Catherine Drinker Bowen has described the text thus:
For Sir Edward Coke, every facet of the land law was a joy to study. What, for instance,
did the word "tenant" mean; from whence derived? And "fee simple"-whether absolute,
conditional, or qualified?... The French for "fee," Coke explains, isfief; in Domesday
Book it wasfeudum. "It is a maxime in law," Littleton had written, in Section 3. Coke
seized upon the phrase. "Maxim," he wrote; "i.e., a sure foundation or ground of art, a
principle, all one with a rule, a common ground, postulatum or an axiome, which it were
too much curiositie to make nice distinctions betweene them." The two words "in law" set
Coke off upon a zestful frolic into laws of the Crown, statute law, law canon and civil, lex
naturale (the law of nature) and communis Lex Angliae, the common law of England.
BOWEN, supra note 66, at 511-12. "To Coke," she concludes, "it was impossible that every scholar,
if he but persisted, would not share his appetite for such excursions. 'We have armed our student,'
says Coke brightly, 'with the signification of ancient bookes, charters, deeds, and records, to the end
he may proceed in his reading with alacrity, and set upon, and know how to worke into with delight
these rough mines of hidden treasure."' Id.
170. EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INsrrrTns OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*"Proeme" (reprint ed. 1986) (London 1797).
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land have sprung."' 171 As Catherine Drinker Bowen has observed, "[a]ll
that he urged in the House of Commons was here set down with particu-
lar eloquence and authority."'' 72 The law of the land, to Coke, meant the
due process of the common law: hence, for example, all monopolies were
against Magna Carta "because they are against the liberty and freedome
of the subject, and against the law of the land." 173 Further, Coke de-
clared, a man "cannot be sent against his will into Ireland, to serve the
King; which being an exile is prohibited by this Act."' 74 It is little won-
der that Coke's contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, attacked the Institutes
on the grounds that Sir Edward seemed "on purpose to diminish... the
King's authority." 175 The same Whig constitutionalism that appalled
that advocate of monarchical sovereignty no doubt was found immensely
satisfying to American Whigs in the decades preceding the Revolution.
The third Institute contained an account of the criminal law. It was
the most readable of the four Institutes and also probably the least politi-
cally controversial at the time of its original publication, 1644. Coke,
drawing frequently on his own experience as Attorney General under
Elizabeth and James I for anecdotal embellishment, defined each crime,
gave its history, and the penalty the law prescribed. "Coke's views on
high treason had not changed since his early days as prosecutor," notes
Bowen.' 76 "Murder and homicide, robbery and rape-all these were
clear; their history and provenance did not touch on politics, though
Coke criticized in strong terms the cruelty of current penalties."'177
In the fourth and last Institute, a description of the jurisdiction of the
various courts in England, it was
Coke the Parliament man all over again.... Courts of equity and Excheq-
uer, the Court of Chancery, Star Chamber, Admiralty: in the Fourth Insti-
tute, Coke describes them all. "And our desired end is," he says, "that all
these high and honourable tribunals ... may prosper and flourish in distri-
bution of justice, which assuredly they shall doe, if they derive all their
power and strength from the proper roots." Their proper roots, to Edward
Coke, lay in the common law-and in Parliament, servant and handmaid of
171. Id. at *46.
172. BOWEN, supra note 66, at 516. For a fine, well-balanced account of Coke's career in the
House of Commons, see STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND "THE GRIEVANCES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH," 1621-1628 (1979).
173. BOWEN, supra note 66, at 517 (quoting COKE, supra note 170, at *47).
174. Id. (quoting COKE, supra note 170, at *47).
175. Id. at 514-15.
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the common law. "These things being understood," says Coke in a phrase
that has been quoted for centuries, "let us now peruse our ancient authors,
for out of the old fields must come the new come."' 178
Throughout the Fourth Institute, Bowen adds, "there runs a serene as-
surance which to royalists must have been more disturbing than the
loudest rantings of the House of Commons." 179 The parliament held in
the third year of Charles I -the parliament of 1628, of the Petition of
Right-was "benedictum parliamentum, the blessed parliament," to
Coke. 180
Early American students of the law, after making their way through
Coke's Institutes, not unsurprisingly came to the conclusion that the con-
stitution-the "law of the law," rooted in custom since time immemo-
rial-limited the powers of all officers of government, including the
monarch.181 Their belief that such limitations were part of an unwritten
"ancient constitution" was further strengthened by their reading of Whig
history.
B. English Rights: The Whig Approach to History
"It has ever appeared to me," Jefferson wrote to the English Real
Whig John Cartwright in 1824, "that the difference between the Whig
and Tory of England is that the Whig deduces his rights from the Anglo-
Saxon source, and the Tory from the Norman.."182 He congratulated
Cartwright for deducing the English constitution from "its rightful root,
the Anglo-Saxon," and added that
although this constitution was violated and set at naught by Norman force,
178. Id. at 520.
179. Id. at 520-21.
180. Id. at 521.
181. Evidence that Americans drew these conclusions from Coke's treatise abounds in Revolu-
tionary-era writings. For example, James Otis relied not only on Coke's opinion in Dr. Bonham's
Case, but also on the "Proeme" of Coke's Second Institutes, in presenting his arguments in 1761 that
the writs of assistance-warrants that authorized customs officials to conduct a general search of any
place thought to contain smuggled goods-were against common law and therefore void. Similarly,
John Adams delved into Coke's Institutes to demonstrate, in his Novanglus essays in 1775, that the
common law obliged the King to "rule the divers nations and kingdoms of his empire" according to
each of their "distinct laws." See H. TREVOR COLBOURN, THE LAMP OF EXPERIENCE: WHIG
HISTORY AND THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 68-70, 94-95 (1965).
182. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), reprinted in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 102, at 42, 44. See also letter from Thomas Jefferson
to George Washington Lewis (Oct. 25, 1825), reprinted in id. at 128 ("The Whig historians of Eng-
land have always gone back to the Saxon period for the true principles of the constitution, while the
Tories and Hume, their Coryphaeus, date it from the Norman Conquest .... ).
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yet force cannot change right. A perpetual claim was kept up by the na-
tion, by their perpetual demand of a restoration of their Saxon laws; which
shows they were never relinquished by the will of the nation. In the pul-
lings and haulings for these ancient rights, between the nation, and its kings
of the races of Plantagenets, Tudors, and Stuarts, there was sometimes gain,
and sometimes loss, until the final reconquest of their rights from the
Stuarts. 183
This passage nicely illustrates the extent to which the historical vision of
Jefferson and his contemporaries was shaped by the romantic view that
historians have called the "Whig interpretation" of English history.1" 4
The Whig historians' approach to English history, particularly the his-
tory of English government after the Norman conquest-the so-called
"Saxon Myth"-has been nicely summarized by H. Trevor Colbourn,
who contrasted it with the Tory historians' view.
There had developed ... two principal views of English history; the one,
ususally the more accurate by modem scholastic standards, can be called
the tory interpretation-although not in any party sense; the other is rea-
sonably familiar as the whig interpretation, although it too existed long
before a formal Whig party and continued long after the Whig politicians
opportunistically lost interest in it. The historical whigs were writers seek-
ing to support parliamentary claims upon the royal prerogatives by exalting
the antiquity of parliament and by asserting that their political ambitions
had solid foundation in ancient customs. They presented an idealized ver-
sion of an Anglo-Saxon democracy, which they usually found overturned
by Norman treachery and feudalism. The tory historians instead preferred
to see the parliamentary claims as without any ancient source, and viewed
Anglo-Saxon England as feudalistic, but lacking in Norman stability and
order. 185
The Whig historians began with a model of government, introduced into
the nations of northern Europe by the barbarian tribes that settled there,
and saw in that model the original constitution. At the same time, how-
ever, they argued that the constitution remained unchanged on a theoret-
ical level. To the Whig historians, the whole of English constitutional
183. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), reprinted in 16 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 102, at 44.
184. H. Trevor Colbourn, Thomas Jefferson's Use of the Past, 15 WM. & MARY Q. 3d ser. 56, 59
(1958) (citing, inter alia, the pioneering essay by Herbert Butterfield, The Englishman and His His-
tory (1944)).
185. Id. On the influence of Whig history on colonial Americans generally, see COLBOURN,
supra note 181, at 3-20, 185-93. On the persistence of the "Saxon myth" into the nineteenth century,
see id. at 194-98 ("The Saxon Myth Dies Hard," summarizing the work of William Stubbs and other
Whig historians of Victorian England).
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history since the Norman conquest was the story of a perpetual claim,
kept up by the English nation, for a restoration of Saxon laws and the
ancient rights those laws guaranteed.
According to the Whig historians, "whilst all the rest of Europe
groaned under the galling yoke of tyranny and oppression," '186 the tribes
of Germany preserved their native political liberty in a model of govern-
ment "as far superior to the Greek and Roman commonwealths, as these
surpassed the governments of the Medes and Persians."1 s7  Citing
Tacitus' Germania, the Whig historians described as the key element of
this "Gothick model of government" the general assemblies, in which all
important matters were decided and outstanding men were chosen as
leaders to determine the affairs of lesser consequence.18 8
As the German tribes increased in number, they conquered neighbor-
ing territories for the settling of their people, some of whom, "distin-
guished by the name of Saxons," settled in England "about the year four
hundred and fifty."..8 9 After destroying the native Britons or driving
them westward into Wales, the Saxons distributed the lands amongst the
various tribes who had settled as "little republics," paralleling the polit-
ical organization that had prevailed in their native lands.190
The land the Saxons conquered "was vested in the collective body of
the people, and not in any one person,"'191 demonstrating to the Whig
historians that Saxon land tenures were not feudal, or at least that the
feudalism of the Saxons was not as fully developed as that of the later
Norman conquerors. Those lands reserved for the Saxon princes were
called by various names: Thane-land, granted to the Thanes, or lords;
Reve-land, over which the king's officers had jurisdiction; Boc-land, or
book-land, held by a charter; and Folk-land, held without writing, usu-
186. GEORGE ST. AMAND, An Historical Essay on the Legislative Power of England, in 2 A
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF THE LORDS' PROTESTS, at ii (London 1767).
187. OBADIAH HULME, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON THE ENGLISH CONSTrTiON 3 (London
1771). See also ROBERT MOLESWORTH, AN AccouNT OF DENMARK 42-43 (London, 1694) ("The
Ancient Form of Government here was the same which the Goths and Vandals established in most,
if not all parts of Europe, whither they carried their Conquest, and which in England is retained to
this day for the most part.... All Europe was beholden to these people for introducing or restoring a
Constitution of Government far excelling all others that we know of in the world.").
188. ST. AMAND, supra note 186, at iii-iv; TACITUS, Germania, in WORKS, 323-25, 328
(Gordon trans., London 1731).
189. HULME, supra note 187, at 3.
190. ST. AMAND, supra note 186, at xiii.
191. Id. at viii.
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ally by the few remaining ancient inhabitants.19 2 In these lands held by
feudal tenures, "the feudal relations were far from running in that regu-
lar subordination" that, in later centuries, made the feudal connections
"so compleat" that the sub-vassals held their lands under the crown vas-
sals in the same manner that the latter held under the crown.1 93 Because
the Saxons, "a cruel and extirpating race," eliminated the native Britons,
there was an abundance of land; accordingly, the lesser Saxon chiefs
would not submit to feudal regulations for a mere grant of land. 194 Fur-
ther, the Saxon princes' "being rather plunderers than princes," their at-
tendants were more like associates than subjects; "from thence arose that
degree of equality of princes and chieftains which is so contradictory to
the feudal system and the rights of the superior lord." 195
Thus, the feudal law as understood in the ninth and tenth centuries
was, according to the Whig historians, "unknown to our Saxon ancestors
before the Norman invasion." 196 The lands not reserved for the princes
were parcelled out to the chieftains within the various Saxon kingdoms;
the chieftains in turn apportioned them among the individual families of
each tribe. These lands were held allodially, the individual families hold-
ing the annual use, their seignories held not under the king but under the
public or kingdom. Thus, not only did the Saxons not develop their feu-
dal tenures fully, but also a great deal of the land continued to be allo-
dial, not held by feudal tenures at all. 197
With so many lands held allodially in Saxon England, "it was neces-
sary to subject in a political capacity those who were not subjected in a
feudal."'1 98 Within each Saxon kingdom, the allodial lands were divided
into counties, or shires, which were in turn divided into wapentakes, or
hundreds, and these in turn subdivided into boroughs and rural tythings.
Each of these "little republics" was self-governing, and within each all
192. JOHN DALYRMPLE, AN ESSAY TOWARDS A GENERAL HISTORY OF FEUDAL PROPERTY IN
GREAT BRITAIN 10 (London 1759).
193. Id. at 12-13.
194. Id. at 15-16.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 15 ("...that infinite variety of rights, arising from the closer union, betwixt the king
and his vassals, and from the subordination of that union descending through the various ranks of
the nation, was as yet not known."). Ironically, the savageness of the Saxons thus may be credited
for making possible the nobility of their constitution. This point was less obvious to some Whig
historians than to others.
197. Id. at 7-9, 12.
198. Id. at 11.
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those to whom lands were apportioned had a say in the government. 199
Over time, as the population grew and the seven Saxon kingdoms merged
into one, "the exercise of the legislative power became impracticable in
the person of every individual"; although the individuals "ever retained
their native right of being governed by laws made by themselves," that
right was exercised indirectly, through their representatives. 2 ' ° These
representatives were none other than the presiding judges or magistrates,
elected annually within each borough or tything. Such wites, or wise
men as they were called, along with the king's thanes, and the bishops
and abbots as representatives of the clergy, comprised the "witenage-
mot," or Saxon parliament. This parliament was literally an assembly of
"wise men," an assembly of "all the presiding judges of the nation, earls,
bishops, and wites, or the annual magistrates of the tythings or boroughs,
who represented all the proprietors of land in their respective
tythings. 20
1
A key characteristic of the Whig historians' "Gothick model of gov-
ernment," then, was the fact that each piece of land-or, equivalently,
every proprietor of land-was represented, directly or indirectly, in the
assembly.2° 2 Just as the whole collective body took the lands the Saxons
conquered and distributed them to all who had a right to share in the
conquest, so too was the making of laws entrusted to the whole nation, as
represented in the assembly. The Saxons "had one mode of govern-
ment," whether for a town, a wapentake, a shire, or a kingdom: govern-
ment by representatives, elected annually by each inhabitant of the
respective district who "paid his shot and bore his lot." 2 3
Each level of government had its equivalent of a court of council to
make laws, a court of law to enforce laws, and a chief magistrate to ad-
minister the laws. The laws limited the chief magistrate's power, and this
limitation applied equally to kings, the chief magistrates of the nation,
the only difference being the circle and the duration of authority: the
199. HULME, supra note 187, at 12-16; ST. AMAND, supra note 186, at xlv-xlvii, 1.
200. ST. AMAND, supra note 186, at lix.
201. 1 PAUL DE RAPIN, SIEUR DE THOYRAS, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, at xiv-xv (Tindal
trans., London 1757) [hereinafter RAPIN]; 2 RAPIN, supra, at 32-33 (footnote by Tindal). From this,
Whig historians concluded that the House of Commons was always a part of Parliament. See, eg.,
ST. AMAND, supra note 186, at Ix. Later generations of historians would find this argument one of
the more blatant examples of the Whig historians' distortion of the record of the evolution of the
English constitution. See SAYLES, supra note 39.
202. 2 RAPIN, supra note 201, at 34.
203. HULME, supra note 187, at 27-29.
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magistrate's was annual and confined to the walls of the town, while the
king's was for life and extended over the whole kingdom.2° Thus, the
English constitution in its original form-as it was under the Saxons-
was "an intimate union between the prince and the people," connected
by the witenagemot, the assembly of wise men "who represented the
whole nation. ' 20
5
The Whig historians argued that William the Conquerer's conquest of
England "contaminated the purity of the English constitution" by mix-
ing with the old Saxon laws, "founded on the principles of liberty," the
new establishment of the Normans, founded on "the principles of slav-
ery." 206 Although the English constitution continued fundamentally as a
union between the crown and the people, connected by a parliament
nominally representative of the whole nation, the weight of the "Norman
yoke" greatly altered the character of that union in two respects. First,
the imposition of Norman feudalism so changed the composition of Par-
liament that it no longer adequately checked the power of the King.
Thus, although the executive authority in theory continued to be con-
fined to a certain sphere of action, prescribed by the law, it in fact was
quite arbitrary. Second, in addition to the change in composition of Par-
liament, the dilution of the elective power of the people made Parliament
less and less representative of the will of the nation. In time it came to
reflect not only the will of the sovereign but also the will of certain fac-
tions that had come to power. These changes supposed by the Whig
historians merit closer examination.
As previously noted, the Whig historians argued that under the Sax-
ons, feudalism had not fully developed: their rear-vassals had no clearly
defined feudal holdings (Dalrymple noted that their grants of land were
not hereditary, for example207), and even the vassals "of the crown,"
properly speaking, held not of the crown but of the realm. William of
Normandy, however, "came from a country where the greater power of
the prince had soon rivetted the feudal duties of the crown vassals, and
had given time and room for the rights of the rear vassals to ripen. "208
William redistributed the lands of his former Saxon opponents among his
own confederates, who held of the crown by a service and who in turn
204. Id. at 28-30.
205. 1 RAPIN, supra note 201, at xiii.
206. HULME, supra note 187, at 8, 38.
207. DALRYMPLE, supra note 192, at 269.
208. Id. at 16-18.
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enfeoffed their own immediate followers with some portions of land
under reservation of a service. Over most tythings was placed a Norman
chief, or baron, alongside the existing Saxon earls to undermine their
power. The estates of the Norman chiefs were called baronies, and the
barons recognized no superior but the King. The distinction between
allodial and feudal lands was eliminated, since the former as well as the
later were held by military tenures. All the fiefs of the nation, lower as
well as higher, became hereditary and acquired firmness, and subse-
quently the feudal incidents such as escheats, wards and marriages devel-
oped, to which "the independency of the Saxons would never have
submitted. ' '209 Only the boroughs were left by the Normans in the same
condition as in Saxon times; and at least at the beginning of William's
reign, they continued to be governed by magistrates whom they chose
annually.
Although "every spot of land" was still represented in Parliament, it
was represented in Norman times through either a barony or a borough
rather than through some tything. The rural tythings no longer were
represented by wites chosen annually; rather, the barons represented
them. "Greater" barons were personally summoned to Parliament,
while "lesser" barons, after Magna Carta, were summoned generally, and
represented indirectly by the knights of the shires, chosen at the county
courts by the lesser barons of each shire.210 Thus did the government fall
into the hands of "a new order of men, with new authority derived from
the king."' 21 William, in creating the new seats in Parliament, amassed a
great deal of power; he "put his finger upon the great artery of the consti-
tution, and stopped the circulation of all power arising from the Saxon
principles of government."'2 2
The new government seized church property, imposed heavy taxes,
and depopulated a great portion of Hampshire to make room for the
Conqueror's New Forest. The arbitrary rule of one man replaced rule of
law. Even the boroughs, which continued to be represented in Parlia-
ment by men of their own choosing (called burgesses instead of wites,
probably because the magistrates were not always chosen representa-
tives), periodically succumbed to the power of the crown: frequently the
crown forced the towns to surrender their rights of self-government and
209. Id. at 16-19.
210. 2 RAPIN, supra note 201, at 33-34 (note by Tindal).
211. HULME, supra note 187, at 48.
212. Id. at 47.
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then to repurchase them to pay for the wars that medieval English kings
were fond of waging.213 In addition, because parliamentary seats did not
change with demographic patterns, over a period of centuries the bor-
oughs became quite unevenly represented: deserted boroughs retained
their seats, while new commercial towns, such as Birmingham, had
hardly any representatives at all.214 By the time of the Tudors, every
spot of land was still represented, but the representation had lost the
logical simplicity it once had under the Saxons.
To the Whig historians, Duke William's "conquest" of England was
no less a conquest because he "accepted" the crown under color of a
legitimate claim and began his reign by taking the usual oath of the
Saxon kings. Although he and many of his successors "seduced" the
English people by this "seeming indulgence," '215 the King's oath-tak-
ing-like the fiction of an elective monarchy216-- showed the Whig his-
torians that, by insisting on the restoration of the ancient mode at the
beginning of every reign, the English people "kept up a title to their
Saxon privileges" that even the Norman kings "acknowledged... to be
just." 7 Some of William's successors-Henry I, most notably-con-
firmed the ancient Saxon privileges and renounced the unjust preroga-
tives of their predecessors. In addition, Magna Carta signified an end to
the distinction between Norman and Saxon by demonstrating that the
Norman lords, as anxious as the Saxons to be secured in their acquisi-
tions free of the arbitrary power of the crown, had by degrees "put on the
English genius, wholly addicted to liberty."2 8 In spite of these partial
restorations of Saxon laws, however, much arbitrary power continued to
be vested in the crown.21 9 The nation continued to feel the heavy weight
of the "Norman yoke," long after the two races had merged, to the ex-
213. 2 RAPIN, supra note 201, at 33; HULME, supra note 187, at 58-59.
214. HULME, supra note 187, at 75-76.
215. 2 RAPIN, supra note 201, at 79.
216. Whig historians differed in their views about an elective monarchy. Rapin noted that the
basically hereditary nature of the crown did not prevent Parliament in extraordinary cases from
claiming a power to overrule custom and settle the succession on a more distant relative. 2 RAPIN,
supra note 201, at 47. Henry Care went further, arguing that succession to the crown was not at all
generally by hereditary right, but rather by act of Parliament, "in which the consent of the whole
nation is virtually included by their representatives" and so directed "according to the presumed will
of the people." HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE
98 (6th ed. Providence, R.I. 1774).
217. 2 RAPIN, supra note 201, at 76-77; HULME, supra note 187, at 60.
218. 2 RAPIN, supra note 201, at 162-63, 464.
219. HULME, supra note 187, at 71.
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tent to which the monarchy, theoretically circumscribed by law and kept
in line by a Parliament representative of the nation, continued to exercise
arbitrary powers outside the bounds of legitimate prerogative.
The Whig historians' concern for the constitutionally legitimate main-
tenance of the union between the crown and the people extended not
only to the composition of Parliament, but also to its duration. Just as
the representation of every man who "paid his shot and bore his lot"
helped insure that the consent of Parliament was every man's consent
(or, at least, the consent of every proprietor of land), annual elections
kept that consent legitimate. The annual exercise of the elective power,
to at least one Whig historian, was "the quintessence, the life and soul of
[the Saxons'] constitution, and the basis of the whole fabrick of their
government, from the internal police of the minutest part of the country,
to the administration of the government of the whole kingdom."22 The
House of Commons was representative of the people only insofar as it
was "constitutionally so, that is, for one year; agreeable to the ancient
law of the land, and confirmed by a statute, of Edward III, which de-
clares, 'that parliaments should be holden every year, or oftener, if need
be, for the redress of divers mischiefs and grievances that daily hap-
pen.' "22 That the Saxon witenagemots were annual is not surprising,
since the wites held their offices for only one year.
Even after the Norman establishment changed the composition of Par-
liament into one of knights and burgesses instead of wites, it appeared to
the Whig historians that annual parliaments were the rule from the time
of Edward III until Henry VIII lengthened his parliaments as "the most
effectual means for rendering the members obedient to his will." '222 Mary
Tudor restored annual Parliaments, and they continued until the Trien-
nial Act in the reign of Charles I. From then on, the history was erratic,
with new Parliaments never again being held more often than every three
years. No Parliament at all met for eleven years under Charles I; the
"long," or "rebel," Parliament continued itself for some twenty years;
Charles II's "pensioned" Parliament continued for eighteen years; the
Triennial Act was reinstituted under William III, only to be repealed
under George I and replaced by the Septennial Act.223 Moreover, a law
in the reign of Anne made a landed qualification for members of the
220. Id. at 7.
221. Id. at 115.
222. 1 JAMES BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS 88 (London 1774).
223. HULME, supra note 187, at 107-28.
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Commons and converted Parliament into "a down-right rank aristocracy
of the rich in land," composed of the "RICH MEN" rather than the
"WISE MEN. '224
Dilution of the elective power of the people, coupled with the inade-
quacy of representation, resulted in a Parliament that no longer repre-
sented the nation. A Parliament sitting not for one but for three or seven
years lacked "that confidence between the commons and the people,
which had been the support of the constitution for many ages. ' 225 Point-
ing to such examples as the rapid and complete transition back to popery
under Mary Tudor and the shifts in control of the 1647-48 Parliament
between Independents and Presbyterians, the Whig historians showed
that "the determination of a Parliament is not always a convincing proof
of the approbation of the whole English nation. ' 226 In the ebb and flow
of the political tides under the Houses of Tudor, Stuart, and Hanover,
Parliament fell under the influence of monarchs, armies, and corrupt
ministers.
The Whig historians thus were not surprised that the union between
crown and people-a union cemented by a parliament representative of
the whole nation-fell apart in the mid-seventeenth century. They
blamed both King and Parliament for the civil war:
[A] wise and prudent king of England will never quarrel with his Parlia-
ment; and a Parliament, whose sole view is the kingdom's welfare, will take
care never to question the king's just prerogative; nay, they will rather
chuse to see it stretched a little too far, than run the risk of breaking the
union.2
2 7
Although the matter of the extent of the royal prerogative-the con-
stant occasion of quarrels between Parliament and the Stuarts, with each
side "pulling and hauling" for what it considered its ancient right-was
224. Id. at 126 (emphasis in original). The statute was ostensibly designed to lessen the influence
of the Court. Hulme criticized this rationalization: "Our constitution hath not placed the indepen-
dency of the house of commons upon the riches, honour or virtue of the members of that house; but
she hath placed it upon an IMPOSSIBILITY of its being corrupted." Id. at 149 (emphasis in
original).
225. Id. at 139.
226. 7 RAPIN, supra note 201, at 24-25; 10 id. at 483-523.
227. 8 id. at 216. Note that Rapin's treatment of the civil war to some degree attempted to
vindicate Oliver Cromwell, whose actions, Rapin claimed, were no, more arbitrary than those for
which Elizabeth had been praised. "Since, therefore, as matters then stood, England was to be
governed by force, was it more convenient to see the nation ruled by the greatest general and states-
man the kingdom had for many years produced, than by a parliament, independent or presbyterian,
or by a king intoxicated with arbitrary power?" 11 id. at 68.
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resolved by the constitutional settlement following the "glorious"
Revolution of 1688, the restoration of the ancient Saxon constitution was
incomplete, to the satisfaction of the Whig historians. The influence of
the Hanoverian court in the election of members of Parliament, in part
occasioned by the division into Whig and Tory parties; the unequal rep-
resentation of boroughs in Parliament; the lack of instructions binding
members of Parliament to the wills of their constituencies; the purchas-
ing of boroughs; the bribery and corruption at elections; and, of course,
the lack of annual elections: these were the sad facts that troubled the
Whig historians concerned with preserving the English constitution ac-
cording to its original "mixed" character.228 They raised their banner-
"where annual election ends, there slavery begins"-and called for En-
glishmen to defend their constitutional rights and liberties by organizing
legal associations, "the only effectual remedy the people of England have
now left, for the redress of their grievances." '229
C. Natural Rights: The Whig Approach to Government
As J.G.A. Pocock has shown, English Whiggism followed in part from
the "common-law version" of history; but some of the more radical
Whigs "went on... to reject history altogether and aver that the crite-
rion by which any government must be judged was not its antiquity, but
its rationality."2 From their standpoint, the Saxon constitution was in
itself noble because it was based on "the natural rights of mankind."23
That it was also the original English constitution was simply a happy
coincidence. As one of these Whigs, Algernon Sidney, wrote, "The Eng-
lish nation has always bin [sic] governed by itself or its representa-
tives." '232 It mattered not whether the assemblies "were frequent or rare;
composed of many or few persons, sitting altogether in one place, or in
more; what name they had; or whether every free man did meet and vote
228. See 12 id. at 264-66; HULME, supra note 187, at 153-57.
229. HULME, supra note 187, at 161. Interestingly, the Whig historians' banner cry, "Where
Annual Election ends, Tyranny begins," appeared on the frontispiece of a book published in
America early in July 1776. Although the book contained the first book-form publication of the text
of the Declaration of Independence, almost three-quarters of it comprised excerpts from Hulme's
Historical Essay. "DEMOPHILUS," THE GENUINE PRINCIPLES OF THE ANCIENT SAxON, OR ENG-
LISH CONSTITUTION (1776), discussed in H. COLBOURN, supra note 181, at 190-91.
230. POCOCK, ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, supra note 61, at 232.
231. HULME, supra note 187, at 4.
232. ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 379 (1698).
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in his person, or a few were delegated by many. '23 3 All that mattered
was that the Saxons "ordered all things according to their own plea-
sure, '2 34 for "that which a people does rightly establish for their own
good, is of as much force the first day, as continuanace can ever give to it;
and therefore in matters of the greatest importance, wise and good men
do not so much inquire what has bin, as what is good and ought to
be." 235
Pocock suggests that, because they were not bound by historical prece-
dent, the Whig philosophers of government were not troubled by a di-
lemma that confronted the Whig historians: they were not forced to
choose between Parliamentary sovereignty and monarchical sovereignty.
Instead, the appeal to rationality led them to the concept of popular sov-
ereignty. From that concept, the Whig philosophers derived notions
about natural rights and the remodeling of governments-notions which
in turn eventually underlay the case for American independence as as-
serted in the Declaration of Independence.
Those notions, though generally described by scholars as "Lockean,"
were not original to Locke's Second Treatise. Some scholars have greatly
exagerated the influence of John Locke while others have unjustifiably
trivialized it.236 Locke, together with Algernon Sidney237 and many of
233. Id. at 382.
234. Id. at 383.
235. Id. at 380.
236. Compare CARL L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE
HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS (reprint ed. 1960) with GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEF-
FERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978). Becker's study, first published in 1922, viewed
Locke as the most notable influence on the phraseology of the Declaration, as well as the most
representative figure for "the philosophy of Nature and Natural Law." BECKER, supra, at 74. Wills,
apparently hostile to Locke's treatise because of its later association with nineteenth-century liber.
alism, attempted to substitute for Locke the Scottish "moral-sense" philosophers, and particularly
Hutcheson, as the pivotal influences on Jefferson's Declaration.
Ronald Hamowy has decisively refuted Wills' study. Hamowy marshalled the evidence in favor of
a Lockean influence and showed that the Scottish philosophers had no demonstrable influence on the
political thought of Jefferson-and indeed, that, if Hutcheson did have an influence, it would have in
no way detracted from Locke's since Hutcheson himself was closely acquainted with Locke's polit-
ical writings. Ronald Hamowy, Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Garry Wills'
Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 3d ser. 503 (1979).
Hamowy also has responded persuasively to his own critics. Communications, 37 WM. & MARY Q.
3d ser. 529 (1980) (comments by Nicholas Varga and Gilman Ostrander with a reply by Hamowy).
An excellent summary of the historiographical debate over the importance of Locke, in the
broader context of eighteenth-century Anglo-American thought, may be found in Kramnick, Repub-
lican Revisionism, supra note 20. Kramnick also persuasively argues on behalf of Locke's influence,
particularly among the third generation of Real Whigs discussed in Part III of this Article-Burgh,
Price, Priestley, Cartwright, and other members of the Society for Constitutional Information.
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the Real Whigs of the eighteenth century-writers such as "Cato" (John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon), Robert Molesworth, James Burgh, and
Granville Sharp, all discussed in Part III-comprised a group of radical
Whig philosophers of government whose influence on Revolutionary-era
Americans equalled that of the Whig historians.
The Whig philosophers of government began, logically, with an under-
standing of human nature. Man, "whom we dignify with the honorable
title of Rational," is much more frequently influenced by his passions;238
chief among these passions is self-love, for "it is impossible for any Man
to act upon any other motive than his own interest." '239 In their natural
state all men have an equal right to their natural freedom; reason teaches
all mankind that, all being equal and independent, no one ought to harm
another in his life, liberty, or possessions. 2" Men being naturally equal,
"none ever rose above the rest but by Force or Consent. 2 41 Reason
leads men to see that "they cannot well live asunder"-"since we cannot
endure the Solitude, Barbarity, Weakness, Want, Misery, and Dangers
that accompany it whilst we live alone" 242-"nor [can we live] many to-
gether, without some Rule to which all must submit. 2 43 Accordingly,
men mutually agree to restrain their natural liberty by submission to
laws; "this general consent of all to resign such a part of their Liberty as
seems to be for the good of all, is the voice of Nature, and the act of Men
(according to Natural Reason) seeking their own Good." 2" The consent
must be mutual since "the equality in which men are born is so perfect,
that no man will suffer his natural liberty to be abridged, except others
do the like .... 245
Men consent to give up their free natural state by "agreeing with other
Men to joyn and unite into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and
peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their
Properties," that is, their lives, liberties, and estates.246 The end of civil
237. The dual influence of Locke and Sidney on Revolutionary Americans is briefly discussed,
supra note 102.
238. 1 BURGH, supra note 222, at 1.
239. 1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATo's LETrERs 241 (London 1724) [hereinaf-
ter CATO]; 4 id. at 4.
240. LOCKE, supra note 98, at 269-71 (Second Treatise, Chapter II).
241. 2 CATO, supra note 239, at 275. See also SIDNEY, supra note 232, at 24.
242. SIDNEY, supra note 232, at 23.
243. Id. at 151.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. LOCKE, supra note 98, at 331 (Second Treatise, Chapter VIII).
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society is to avoid and remedy the inconveniences necessarily arising in
the state of nature, in which every man is the judge in his own case.
Consent, therefore, grounds civil society; and consent grounds all lawful,
just, and peaceable government.247 The people may choose whatever
form of government they wish-democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, or
mixed-but regardless of the form, "[a]ll the lawful authority, legislative
and executive, originates from the people": 248
Power in the people is like light in the sun, native, original, inherent, and
unlimited by anything human. In governors, it may be compared to the
reflected light of the moon; for it is only borrowed, delegated, and limited
by the intention of the people, whose it is and to whom governors are to
consider themselves responsible, while the people are answerable only to
God.249
The coercive power of law proceeds from the authority of the legislative
power, which in turn is delegated by the people.250
Civil liberty, as understood by the Whig philsophers of government,
thus meant to be under no other legislative power but that established by
consent in the commonwealth, and to be under the dominion of no law
but that which the legislature shall enact according to the trust placed in
it. Freedom under government is to have a standing rule to live by, com-
mon to everyone in society and made by the legislative power erected in
society. Freedom under government is also not to be subject to the in-
consistent, arbitrary rule of another.21 Again, "the consent of the whole
people, as far as it can be obtained, is indispensably necessary to every
law, by which the whole people are to be bound. 252 Otherwise, the
Whig writers warned, "the whole people are enslaved to the one, or the
few, who frame the laws for them." '253 The consent of the people simi-
larly binds the authority of the magistrate who enforces the law; he "can
have no other just power than what the Laws give." '254 The magistrate
"ought not to take what no Man ought to give, nor exact what no Man
ought to perform. '255
247. Id. at 324-25, 330-31 (Second Treatise, Chapters VII and VIII); 2 CATo, supra note 239, at
53-54.
248. 1 BURGH, supra note 222, at 3-4.
249. Id.
250. SIDNEY, supra note 232, at 457.
251. LOCKE, supra note 98, at 284 (Second Treatise, Chapter IV).
252. 1 BURGH, supra note 222, at 2-3 (emphasis in original).
253. Id. (emphasis in original).
254. SIDNEY, supra note 232, at 250.
255. 2 CATO, supra note 239, at 56.
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Consent alone, however, was not the sole basis of legitimate govern-
ment; it was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. The legitimate
exercise of governmental power also must accord with the ends of polit-
ical society: the further security of one's life, liberty, and possessions. It
is not merely the will of the majority; if it were, a society in which all
peaceful men were protected would become "a conspiracy of the Many
against the Minority." '256
That government can only be pronounced consistent with the design of all
government, which allows to the governed the liberty of doing what, con-
sistently with the general good, they may desire to do, and which only for-
bids their doing the contrary. [Salus populi suprema lex est: ] the sole end
of man's entering into political Societies [being] mutual protection and de-
fense ... whatever Power does not contribute to these Purposes, is not
Government but Usurpation. 2
57
The Whig philosophers were aware not only of the good that may
come from the rational use of government, but also of the evil that may
come from its abuse. "Such is the perverse disposition of man," that
government, "this most useful institution, has been generally debauched
into an engine of oppression and tyranny over those, whom it was ex-
pressly and solely established to defend"-so much so that "in almost
every age and country, the government has been the principal grievance
of the people." '258 Everyone in civil society "ought to be upon his Guard
against another, that he not become the Prey of another." '259 Where the
"public passions"-"every Man's particular Warmth and Concern about
publick Transactions and Events"-are well-regulated and honestly em-
ployed, there is good government; but where they are "knavishly raised
and ill employed," there is that bane of all good Whigs, "Faction." 2"
Positive laws "can never entirely prevent the Arts of crafty Men to evade
256. Id. at 73.
257. I CATO, supra note 239, at 67. The authors of Cato's Letters defined liberty quite broadly:
the Power which every Man has over his own Actions, and his Right to enjoy the Fruits of
his Labour, Art, and Industry, as far as by it he hurts not the Society, or any Members of
it, by taking from any Member, or by hindering him from enjoying what he himself enjoys.
Id. at 72. The authors also were quite aware of the libertarian implications. Each person, they
argued, is "the sole Lord and Arbiter of his own private Actions and Property," which the magis-
trate had no right to direct. "Let People alone, and they will take care of themselves, and do it best;
and if they do not, a sufficient Punishment will follow their Neglect, without the Magistrate's Inter-
position and Penalties." Id. at 74-75.
258. 1 BURGH, supra note 222, at 1-2.
259. 2 CATO, supra note 239, at 241.
260. Id. at 235. "Faction" was defined as "the gratifying of private Passion by publick Means."
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them"; they can only lessen or qualify evil, not abolish it. New laws are
daily made, and new occasions for more laws are daily arising. Law be-
ing "a sign of the Corruption in Man," many laws are "signs of the Cor-
ruption of a State. 2 61
To the Real Whigs it was the right and duty of every citizen to be
watchful of those in power since, "considering what Sort of Creature
Man is, it is scare possible to put him under too many Restraints, when
he is possessed of great Power. '2 62 "Those who are in the Possession of
Power, as all Magistrates are, ought above all other Men, to be narrowly
watched and checked with Restraints stronger than their Temptations to
break them. 2z63 All in society should behave, argued the Whig writers,
in the spirit of what Burgh called "a true and independent Whig":
An independent whig scorns all implicit faith in the state, as well as in the
church. The authority of names is nothing to him; he judges all men by
their actions and behaviour, and despises a knave of his own party as much
as he despises a fool of another. He contents not that any man or body of
men shall do what they please. He claims a right of examining all publick
measures, and if they deserve it, of censuring them. As he never saw much
power possessed without some abuse, he takes upon him to watch those
that have it; and to acquit, or expose them, according as they apply it to the
good of their own country, or their own crooked privileges. 2 4
One rash law may overturn the country at once since "the Liberty, the
Property, nay the Virtue, Credit, and Religion of his Country" are in the
legislator's or the magistrate's hands. 265  "Such is the Misfortune of
Mankind, and so uncertain is the Condition of human affairs, that the
very Power given for Protection, carries in it a sufficient Power to de-
stroy, and so readily does Government slide, and often start, into
Oppression! '266
261. Id. at 253.
262. 1 id at 262.
263. Id. at 88; 3 id. at 76.
264. 1 BURGH, supra note 222, at xvi-xvii.
265. 3 CATO, supra note 239, at 234.
266. Id. The example of Denmark convinced one of the Real Whig writers, Robert Molesworth,
that this was no idle fear.
Denmark had, until the mid-seventeenth century, a "Gothick" model of government, which con-
tinued as pure as it was under the original establishment, with very little variation, except-the fatal
flaw-that the power of the nobles had increased too much. In 1660, at a meeting of the Estates in
Parliament, the Commons, stirred up by the Nobles' assertion of unreasonable prerogatives and
egged on by the clergy, offered the King "their Votes and Assistance to be absolute Monarch of the
Realm, and also that the Crown should descend by Inheritance to his Family, which hitherto had
gone by Election." The Danish Commons erroneously supposed that, at the worst, "they should
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As the people are the fountain of power, and their good the object of
government, so are the people "the last resource when governors betray
their trust. ' 267  "He that institutes, may also abrogate": the people
choose the form of government, and therefore only they can be "fit
Judges of the performance of the Ends of the Institution. ' 26 The people
are "often patient under oppression"; only "a long train of abuses"
would cause them to rebel.269 Accordingly, the general revolt of the peo-
ple, when it occurs, cannot be called a rebellion; it is merely their "re-
sisting oppression, and vindicating their own Liberty. ' 27° As the Whigs
saw it, it would be "a most wicked and absurd position" to say that the
whole people can never be in a situation "to defend and preserve them-
selves, when there is no other Power in Being to protect and defend
them; and much more so, that they must not oppose a tyrant. '271
The Whig writers thus anticipated a natural right of revolution, which,
of course, Americans would exercise in 1776. Indeed, by the eve of the
American Revolution, the Whig writers also had anticipated the later
American experience with constitutional conventions and popular ratifi-
cation of written constitutions. As James Burgh argued in 1774,
[H]appy is that people, who having originally so principled their constitu-
tion, that they themselves can without violence to it, lay hold of its power,
wield it as they please, and turn it, when necessary, against those to whom
it was entrusted, and who have exerted it to the prejudice of its original
proprietors.272
Burgh was building on ideas Algernon Sidney first advanced some eighty
years earlier. Sidney had argued that good governments "admit of
Changes in the Superstructures, whilst the Foundations remain un-
only change many Masters for one." The King accepted their offer, forced the Nobles to comply,
and was immediately inaugurated as an absolute, hereditary monarch. Within a four-day period, the
Kingdom of Denmark had changed from a sort of Aristocracy "to as absolute a Monarchy as any is
at present in the World." The Commons subsequently learned "that the little Finger of an Absolute
Prince can be heavier than the Loyns of many Nobles; the only comfort they have left them being to
see their former Oppressors in almost as miserable Condition as themselves." Most ironic was that,
at the crucial moment, the King had begun to waver; had some nobles had the courage to oppose
what was happening, Denmark might have been spared its oppression. MOLESWORTH, supra note
187, at 44, 46-47, 52-54, 69-73.
267. 1 BURGH, supra note 222, at 3-4.
268. SIDNEY, supra note 232, at 15.
269. Gordon, Discourses on Tacitus (Discourse IX), in 2 WORKS, supra note 188, at 94; LOCKE,
supra note 98, at 415 (Second Treatise, Chapter XIX).
270. SIDNEY, supra note 232, at 413-14.
271. 2 CATO, supra note 239, at 17.
272. 1 BURGH, supra note 222, at 4.
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changeable.""27 Burgh followed Sidney's suggestion, and anticipated
American constitutionalism, when he proposed that, "[iln planning a
government by representation, the people ought to provide against their
own annihilation. They ought to establish a regular and constitutional
method of acting by and from themselves, without, or even in opposition
to, their representatives, if necessary." 274
To the Whig philosphers of government, the absence of such a method
was the greatest weakness in the English constitution. Extraordinary
tyrannies in English history required extraordinary acts, often involving
bloodshed. The "glorious" Revolution of 1688-89-all the more glorious
because it was bloodless-was possible only because James II abdicated
the government;275 and it is not clear what, if anything, could be done
against legislative tyranny in England. As James Burgh observed, "[o]ur
ancestors were provident; but not provident enough. They set up parlia-
ments, as a curb on kings and ministers; but they neglected to reserve to
themselves a regular and constitutional method of exerting their power in
curbing parliaments, when necessary. ' 276  Americans would declare
their independence in 1776 exactly for want of such a constitutional
remedy.
V. THE IRRELEVANCE OF BLACKSTONE
Against the background of the preceding discussion of radical Whig
ideology, it is now possible to see why Jefferson regarded Blackstone as a
"tory" in his letter to Madison quoted at the beginning of this Article. A
full understanding of Jefferson's meaning, in turn, reveals the significant
273. SIDNEY, supra note 232, at 134. Sidney explained the need for "change in the Superstruc-
tures" of government, or constitutional change, as follows. The wisdom of man, he argued, is "im-
perfect, and unable to foresee the Effects that may proceed from an infinite variety of Accidents,
which according to Emergencies, necessarily require new Constitutions, to prevent or cure the mis-
chiefs arising from them, or to advance a good that at the first was not thought on." Accordingly,
"all human Constitutions are subject to corruption, and must perish, unless they are timely renewed,
and reduced to their first principles." Id. at 117, 136. In suggesting a method for constitutional
change, Sidney departed significantly from Locke, who did not go so far as to suggest that the people
might exercise their sovereign power, constitutionally and short of a revolution.
274. 1 BURGH, supra note 222, at 6 (emphasis in original).
275. Rapin went to great lengths--specifying six justifications-to prove that the manner in
which James II left England amounted to "an entire desertion" of his kingdom and a "putting of his
subjects into the state in which nature dictates to men, to provide for their own safety." 12 RANIN,
supra note 201, at 161. The authors of Cato's Letters observed that the rights men give up when
they leave the state of nature to form political societies return when society dissolves by a demise of
authority and when the constitution does not provide for succession. 2 CATO, supra note 239, at 17.
276. 1 BURGH, supra note 222, at 6 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 70:131
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/5
19921 ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 197
changes that the influence of radical Whig ideas brought about in Ameri-
can constitutional thought-changes that meant that much of Black-
stone's understanding of law would be irrelevant to post-Revolutionary
America.
Part of Jefferson's disdain for Blackstone stemmed from his own early
exposure to Coke's Institutes. As noted above, Blackstone's treatise, The
Commentaries on the Law of England, which was not completed until
two years after Jefferson was admitted to practice, had not formed a part
of Jefferson's own law study. 77 In later years, after use of Blackstone's
treatise became the ordinary course of study for American law students,
Jefferson expressed concern over "the degeneracy of legal science," as he
wrote in an 1812 letter to Judge John Tyler.
The exclusion from the courts of the malign influence of all authorities after
the Georgium sidus became ascendant, would uncanonize Blackstone,
whose book, although the most elegant and best digested of our law cata-
logue, has been perverted more than all others, to the degeneracy of legal
science. A student finds there a smattering of everything, and his indolence
easily persuades him that if he understands that book, he is master of the
whole body of law. The distinction between these, and those who have
drawn their stores from the deep and rich mines of Coke, Littleton, seems
well understood even by the unlettered common people, who apply the ap-
pellation of Blackstone lawyers to these ephemeral insects of the law. 278
277. Nevertheless, Jefferson was familiar with the Commentaries at the time of the Revolution.
Citations from the work appear in the legal commonplace book that Jefferson began as a student;
and both the numerous annotations in his set of the 1770 edition, now in the Library of Congress,
and the references to Blackstone in the marginal notes that Jefferson wrote in many of his books,
some of which are preserved today, attest to Jefferson's careful study of Blackstone. Article 832 of
Jefferson's legal commonplace book cites Blackstone, within Jefferson's abstract of James Wilson's
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament, as
exemplary of the reasoning of "those who allege that the parliament of Great Britain have power to
make laws binding on the American colonies." THOMAS JEFFERSON, COMMONPLACE BOOK 316-17
(Gilbert Chinard ed., 1926).
278. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge John Tyler (June 17, 1812), reprinted in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 102, at 166-67.
In advising prospective students of the law, Jefferson emphasized the importance of obtaining a
knowledge of the state of law at four important stages of its development by using Bracton, Coke,
Bacon, and Blackstone, supplemented by the reports intervening between these writers. The laws of
England, "in their progress from the earliest to the present times," Jefferson noted, "may be likened
to the road of a traveller, divided into distinct stages or resting places, at each of which a review is
taken of the road passed over so far." Jefferson regarded Bracton's "most able work, complete in its
matter and luminous in its method," and Bacon's "sound digest" as highly as Coke's learned and
authoritative "jumble." Jefferson considered Blackstone's Commentaries, though "the most lucid in
arrangement" and "classical in style," lacking, in that it was "only an elementary book" that, unlike
the other three great treatises, did not present "all the subjects of the law in all their details" and
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But Jefferson's views on the undesirability of the Commentaries as a law
text stemmed from more than simply an "old school" bias; his dislike of
Blackstone's "elegance" was more than merely a dissatisfaction with
Blackstone's style per se.
The full context of the letter to Tyler shows that Jefferson regarded
"Blackstone lawyers," those "ephemeral insects of the law," as politically
dangerous, as well as bad lawyers. In the letter to Tyler, Jefferson was
arguing that the English common law applied in the United States only
to the extent that Americans affirmatively adopted it. The British
emigrants to America did not bring with them the common-law rights of
Englishmen, he argued; rather, they brought with them "the rights of
men, of expatriated men." When they adopted the common law, they
did so out of convenience-it was "that system, with which we were fa-
miliar"-and adapted it to their particular circumstances.279 Since the
state of the English law at the date of their emigration constituted the
system adapted here, he wrote Tyler, "we may doubt, therefore, the pro-
priety of quoting in our courts English authorities subsequent to that
adoption; still more, the admission of authorities posterior to the Decla-
ration of Independence." Indeed, argued Jefferson, the English common
law as developed since the accession of George III had no application to
America, for that King's reign "ab initio was the very tissue of wrongs
which rendered the Declaration at last necessary." The relation back to
the beginning of George III's reign would have an additional advantage
for Jefferson: "getting us rid of all of Mansfield's innovations" of the
common law.28 °
therefore required supplementation. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Jan. 16,
1814), reprinted in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 102, at 54-59.
Later in life, Jefferson received a copy of Cooper's edition of Coke's Littleton, which, as he de-
scribed it, "arranged Coke's matter in the method of Blackstone, adding the notes of Lords Hale and
Nottingham and Hairgraves, adding also his own which are excellent." He declared it "beyond
question, the first elementary book to be read-as agreeable as Blackstone, and more profound."
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francis Eppes (Apr. 9, 1822), reprinted in 3 HENRY S. RANDALL,
THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 484 (New York 1858).
279. Jefferson to Tyler, supra note 278, at 165-66.
280. Id. For a concise summary of the reform in English law, particularly commercial law,
which came about through a series of decisions rendered by the Court of King's Bench during the
chiefjusticeship of Lord Mansfield, see MCDONALD, supra note 59, at 114.
Julian Waterman has documented Jefferson's hostility to Lord Mansfield and the "sly poison" of
Mansfield's legal innovations. Waterman suggests that Jefferson's tendency to associate Blackstone
with Mansfield may have been the start of Jefferson's negative view of Blackstone. Julian S. Water-
man, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, 27 ILL. L. REV. 629, 642-45 (1933). For
the relation between Blackstone and Mansfield, see Julian S. Waterman, Mansfield and Blackstone's
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Jefferson's concern over the "degeneracy" of Blackstonian legal sci-
ence, then, was more than an abhorrence of indolence. Jefferson found
much objectionable in the substance of Blackstone's "honeyed Mansfield-
ism." As the 1826 letter to Madison indicates, he particularly found ob-
jectionable Blackstone's treatise's "tory hue."
Most obviously, Blackstone's "tory" sentiments may be found in his
position with respect to the "plantations" in America, which Blackstone
found to be subject to the authority of Parliament.281 Curiously, Black-
stone agreed with Jefferson in supposing that the common law of Eng-
land, as such, had no authority in America. Blackstone was careful to
note that only acts of Parliament in which the colonies were particularly
named would bind them. But in analyzing the American colonies as con-
quered territories subject to the King's authority, and in arguing that
even some acts of Parliament could bind them, Blackstone took a posi-
tion particularly objectionable to the author of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. An extract from his Legal Commonplace Book shows
Jefferson's awareness that Blackstone's concept of sovereignty was an es-
sential part of the argument of those who alleged that Parliament had
power to make laws binding on the American colonies.282 The way com-
mentators used that concept to assert Parliamentary jurisdiction was not
the only feature of Blackstone's view of sovereignty that Jefferson found
objectionable; the view itself, and its relation to Blackstone's arguments
about the nature of law generally and of English law in particular, was
what Jefferson and others found to be the "tory hue" of Blackstone's
treatise.
The Commentaries were "tory" in Jefferson's eyes for two additional
reasons. First, and more obvious, and despite some superficial similari-
ties to Whig histories, the Commentaries in general sought to glorify
Commentaries, 1 U. CHI. L. REv. 549 (1934). Waterman's analysis needs little addition, except to
emphasize that Jefferson's antagonism toward Mansfield was not aroused by the substance of the
innovations themselves (many, if not most, of which Jefferson readily could have admired) but rather
by the way in which Mansfield innovated, independently of the will of the people, which Jefferson
considered to be the source of all law in a truly republican society. Hence, Jefferson thought it
desirable to rid the law of Mansfield's unrepublican innovations. That, he wrote Tyler, would "un-
canonize Blackstone," the protege of Mansfield, and whose Commentaries faithfully reflected the
ideas of his sponsor.
281. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *104.
282. JEFFERSON, supra note 277, at 316-17 (article 832, abstracting James Wilson's Considera-
tions on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament (1774) and citing
I BLACKSTONE, supra note 281, at *48-49).
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what the Real Whigs considered to be a corrupt English constitution.
283
Blackstone equated with the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 the perma-
nent re-establishment of the ancient constitution. Yet the tone of the
final chapter of the Commentaries, if not that of the entire work, was
more than a glorification of the past; it was, in fact, a glorification of the
present state of English law, the "noble monument of ancient simplicity"
with all the "excrescences," however "troublesome," that later genera-
tions have added. 28  It was not the constitution of the mid-eleventh cen-
tury, but the constitution of the mid-eighteenth, to which he referred as
"this noble pile."28 As Daniel Boorstin has noted, Blackstone endeav-
ored to make English law not only a "science," but also a mystery.
Although he shared with Whig historians the primitivistic conviction
that the original form of the legal system had been one of pure and ra-
tional simplicity, Blackstone also argued that "through all legal history
there ran a mysterious purpose which was of its own force improving
institutions," a Providence, "at once so mysterious and so powerful that
283. In the Commonplace Book, Jefferson abstracted Blackstone's history of the feudal system,
JEFFERSON, supra note 277 (Book II, Chapter 4), which attributed to William the Conqueror the
introduction into England of the feudal tenures in fullest rigor. He also copied directly from Black-
stone the statement that
the liberties of Englishmen are not (as some arbitrary writers would represent them) mere
infringements of the king's prerogative, extorted from our princes by taking advantage of
their weakness; but a restoration of that ancient constitution, of which our ancestors had
been defrauded by the art and finesse of the Norman lawyers, rather than deprived by the
force of the Norman arms.
Id at 191-93 (Entry 740); 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 281, *48-52. Blackstone also characterized
English history since the conquest in what appears to be characteristic Whig fashion, as "in general,
a gradual restoration of that ancient constitution, whereof our Saxon forefathers had been unjustly
deprived, partly by the policy, and partly by the force, of the Norman." 4 id. at *413.
The story Blackstone told nevertheless differed in several key respects from that told in the Whig
historian Rapin's History of England. Blackstone's description of the ancient constitution neglects
to mention annual elections and representation of every piece of land in the witenagemot, or the
ancient Saxon assembly-features Rapin and other Real Whig historians stressed, as noted in Part
IV.B. In addition, Blackstone described the constituent parts of Parliament as an assembly not of
the "nation," connecting the people to the King-as did Rapin and other Whig historians-but of
the King and the three estates of the realm, the lords-spiritual, the lords-temporal, and the com-
mons. 1 id at * 155. Finally, Blackstone passed over the Commonwealth period, which he described
as a time of "confusion" and its reforms as "crude and abortive schemes for amending the laws,"
while Rapin devoted due attention to the period and even treated Oliver Cromwell with some sym-
pathy. 4 id. at *43 1; 11 RAPIN, supra note 201, at 3-75, 119. Blackstone was much more sympa-
the-ic to Charles II and his reign, to which he attributed not only "the re-establishment of our
church and monarchy, but also the complete restitution of English liberty, for the first time since it's
total abolition at the Conquest." 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 281, at *431.
284. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 281, at *436.
285. Id.
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in comparison men were bound to be either bungling or insignificant." 286
Blackstone left the would-be reformer in the position of only "a power-
less spectator of a happy story," while illustrating the tangible result of
that story, the "noble pile" of mid-eighteenth century England, with all
its perfection and complexity, with the "sublime" symbol of "an old
Gothic castle.
2 7
A second and far more important reason Jefferson considered the
Commentaries "tory" is evident in Blackstone's concept of sovereignty.
Blackstone argued that different societies may variously constitute their
governments, but all forms of government have in common the essential
attribute of sovereignty. However constituted, "there is and must be in
all of them a supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in
which the jura sumni imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside. ' 2 8 He
followed classical political thought in seeing advantages and disadvan-
tages in the three "pure" forms of government-democracy, aristocracy,
and monarchy-and hence concluded that the best is a mixed govern-
ment, combining the benefits of the other three yet avoiding their basic
flaws. It should not be surprising that he identified the English govern-
ment as such a mixed form and argued that the legislative power, and
"(of course) the supreme and absolute authority of the state," is therefore
vested in Parliament.28 9
The power and jurisdiction of parliament... is so transcendent and abso-
lute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any
bounds.... It hath sovereign and uncontrolable authority in making, con-
firming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and ex-
pounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations,
ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being
the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all govern-
ments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms.
All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the
ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribu-
nal. It can regulate or new model the succession to the crown; as was done
in the reign of Henry VIII and William III. It can alter the established
religion of the land; as was done in a variety of instances, in the reigns of
king Henry VIII and his three children. It can change and create afresh
286. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 25, 74-75 (reprint ed.
1973).
287. Id. at 82, 104; cf. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 281, at *268.
288. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 281, at *48-49.
289. Id. at *143.
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even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was
done by the act of union, and the several statutes for triennial and septen-
nial elections.
2 90
Parliament, Blackstone concluded, "can, in short, do every thing that is
not naturally impossible; and therefore some have scrupled to call it's
power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True
it is, that what they do, no authority on earth can undo."29'
Nor was Blackstone willing to recognize an inherent supreme power in
the people to "remove or alter the legislative," when they find it acting
contrary to the trust reposed in them, as Locke had argued in the Second
Treatise of Government. "However just this conclusion may be in theory,
we cannot adopt it, nor argue from it, under any dispensation of govern-
ment at present actually existing." '29 2 Such a "devolution of power, to
the people at large," argued Blackstone, would dissolve "the whole form
of government" established by that people, reducing all individuals to a
state of nature-"their original state of equality'-and repealing "all
positive law whatsoever before enacted." '293 Blackstone solemnly de-
clares that "[n]o human laws will... suppose a case, which at once must
destroy all law, and compel men to build afresh upon a new foundation;
nor will they make provision for so desperate an event, as must render all
legal provisions ineffectual."2 94 Yet, as Forrest McDonald has noted,
that is the "case" and "event" that the Continental Congress brought
into being by declaring the independence of the thirteen American
states.
2 95
Blackstone's concept of an omnipotent Parliament and his refusal to
recognize any constitutional right of revolution led him to the inevitable
conclusion that "the power of parliament is absolute and without con-
trol." '2 9 6 Blackstone regarded the only practical check on the power of
Parliament, the separation of the executive from the legislative power, as
a means of checking executive power only; he identified the independence
290. Id. at *156-57.
291. Id.
292. Id. at *157.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. McDONALD, supra note 59, at 59.
296. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 281, at *157. Note that in enumerating rules of construction in
the third section of the Introduction to the Commentaries, Blackstone added to his observation that
"acts of parliament cQntrary to reason are void," the caveat that "if the parliament will positively
enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it." Id. at *91.
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of the legislative power with the liberty of the subject.297 And, again, by
Blackstone's definition of civil or political liberty, there was no contradic-
tion in this, for the sovereign, omnipotent Parliament was to decide how
far to restrain individual liberty as "necessary and expedient for the gen-
eral advantage of the public."'2 9 Edward Corwin has argued that this is
a two-fold divergence from Locke's position in the Second Treatise: first
because Locke had suggested public utility as but one requirement of
allowable restraints on liberty; and second because Locke had not made
the legislature the final arbiter.2 99 Limited as was Locke's theory of
revolution, he nevertheless went further than Blackstone in giving the
people a constitutional (albeit only theoretical) right to judge whether the
legislature had abused its trust. Corwin concludes that, despite his
"complacent" language about Magna Carta and the ancient rights of En-
glishmen, when Blackstone sought to trace the limits of the "rights and
liberties" so grandiloquently characterized, he invariably referred to no
more exalted standard than the state of the law in his own day. Hence it
followed from Blackstone's argument that "neither judicial disallowance
of acts of Parliament nor yet the right of revolution has either legal or
constitutional basis. ' 300
It is not surprising, then, that after 1776 Jefferson and some of his
contemporaries viewed Blackstone's concept of sovereignty not only as
logically deficient but also as wholly irrelevant to the American experi-
ence. As Robert M. Cover has noted in his review of St. George Tucker's
1803 edition of the Commentaries, "if any ideological issue can be speci-
fied as having been at the heart of the American Revolution it was
whether sovereignty is indeed indivisible, unconditional, and legislative."
From the American perspective, Blackstone, "like Dante's Virgil," says
Cover, "worked under the insurmountable handicap of living before the
Great Event. '30 1
297. Id. at *140.
298. Id. at *121.
299. CORWIN, supra note 46, at 85-86.
300. Id. at 86.
301. In 1803 Tucker, a judge on the Supreme Court of Errors of Virginia and George Wythe's
successor as Professor of Law at William and Mary College, published an "Americanized" (or, more
properly, a "Virginianized") version of the Commentaries, so extensively annotated that it expanded
Blackstone's original four volumes into five.
In refuting Blackstone on the issue of the locus and the divisibility of sovereignty, Tucker simply
pointed to the structure of the Government of the United States, "by whose constitutions... the
legislative power is restrained within certain limits." From this fact, and from the correlative doc-
trine that constitutions create legislative power, it followed "that supreme, irresistible, absolute, un-
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To Jefferson, sovereignty in the sense meant by Blackstone properly
resided only in "the People."3"2 Jefferson took popular sovereignty seri-
ously, for it was at the heart of the American Revolution: the foundation
of the American republic lay in the principle the Declaration of Indepen-
dence enunciated, that governments derive their just powers from "the
consent of the governed." This principle, derived from the philosophy of
government espoused by the Whig writers, whose ideas were so influen-
tial in America on the eve of the Revolution, was put into practical im-
plementation in the new American state and federal constitutions of the
1780s.303
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has traced the uniquely American attributes of American
constitutionalism directly to the influence on Americans of the Revolu-
tionary era of the ideas of the English radical Whigs of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. The view of government that lay at the heart of
Whig constitutionalism was not, in any meaningful sense, "civic republi-
can." Although writers on both sides of the Atlantic in the mid-eight-
eenth century might use terms such as "virtue" or "corruption" in a civic
republican sense, the paradigm of civic republicanism-like the tradi-
tional paradigm of liberalism with which it competes in the scholarly
debate--only partially tells the story, especially as one moves from the
realm of political theory in general to the more narrowly circumscribed
realm of constitutional theory. To comprehend early American constitu-
tional theory meaningfully, one must comprehend fully its "whig" es-
controlled authority, of which the commentator makes mention ... doth not reside in the legislature,
nor in any other branches of the Government, nor in the whole of them united. .. ." Robert M.
Cover, Book Review, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1475, 1479 (1970) (reviewing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (St. George Tucker ed., reprint 1969) and quoting at 49-50 n.5).
302. Among the distinguishing attributes of Jefferson's constitutional philosophy were a thor-
oughgoing republicanism (which Jefferson understood to mean direct and pervasive popular control
of government), a pure theory of separation of powers, and a strict adherence to the principle of
federalism. These key aspects of Jefferson's thought were all shaped by his reading of the Whig
common-law writers, Whig historians, and "Real Whig" political philosophers, discussed in Part IV.
For a fuller discussion of Jefferson's constitutionalism and the influence of radical Whig thought on
Jefferson, see DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (forth-
coming 1993).
303. See generally WILLI P. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA
(1980).
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sence, which in turn requires the modem reader to grapple with English
radical Whig thought, on its own terms.
The tension between ideas of fundamental law and sovereignty, which
had been a recurring problem in English constitutionalism during the
Tudor and Stuart periods, remained a problem for Anglo-American the-
orists of the mid-eighteenth century. But by the mid-1770s American
Whigs, following ideas articulated in British radical writings, had begun
to develop a coherent constitutionalism which, because it accorded with
the Americans' own experiences with law and politics, revitalized the
"Real Whig" intellectual heritage that the American Whigs shared with
their radical brethren across the water.3 "4 To the Americans, consent
eventually became the vital element: consent defined law as law. Just as
James Whitelocke in 1610 had opposed King James I's imposition of
taxes without the consent of Parliament, so American Whigs in the 1760s
and 1770s opposed Parliament's imposition of taxes without their
consent.
As revealed in the Declaration of Independence, the philosophy of
American Whigs in 1776 combined the Whig approaches to history and
government. American Whigs, in their understanding of English history,
were impressed with "that excellent Equilibrium of power, or mixt gov-
ernment, limited by law, which [their Saxon] ancestors have always most
zealously asserted, and transmitted to [them] as [their] best Birthright
and Inheritance."3 °5 But historical precedent did not limit them; they
admired the Saxon mode of government for its rationality, its consonance
with what they understood to be natural rights. Most of all, they es-
teemed the notion of consent, "the free Representation of the people in
the legislature," as essential to any legitimate government.3a 6 Thus,
when American Whigs found themselves in a situation in which English
history furnished no adequate precedent through which to seek redress of
304. The story of how the American colonial experience with law and politics helped reinforce
Whig ideas is a complex one, far beyond the scope of this Article. One area of inquiry, for example,
is the American experience with the common law. The colonists' selective reception of the common
law, according to their own particular needs, taught them the rudiments of popular sovereignty and
legal positivism in a way that Englishmen could not quite perceive. See generally WILLIAM E.
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSA-
CHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975); Julius Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth
Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 416 (1931).
305. GRANVILLE SHARP, A DECLARATION OF THE PEOPLE'S NATURAL RIGHT TO A SHARE IN
THE LEGISLATURE; WHICH IS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION OF
STATE 14-15 (Da Capo Press 1971) (London 1774) (emphasis in original).
306. Id.
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their grievances, they abandoned history and turned to philosophy, as-
serting their general rights as human beings in addition to their particu-
lar rights as members of the British empire.
The theory of government articulated in the Declaration, by focusing
upon popular consent, modified the concept of sovereignty significantly,
changing its locus from the government to the people. The notion of an
ultimate supremacy of the people, as Locke suggested in his Second Trea-
tise or as James Burgh outlined in his Political Disqusitions, was sharply
limited; as Bailyn observes, it was "normally dormant and exercised only
at moments of rebellion against tyrannical government," such as the Glo-
rious Revolution."0 7 Even then, the ultimate right of the people to dis-
solve and reconstruct their government was never seriously suggested, at
least not by Locke. If Parliament did derive sovereignty from the people,
that grant was irrevocable. It was not so in American revolutionary ide-
ology. The notion of the ultimate supremacy of the people carried over
into the uniquely American notion of sovereignty seated in the people.
30 8
When, for example, the Massachusetts General Court announced in
1776 that the Sovereign Power "resides always in the body of the People"
and that it "never was, or can be delegated, to one Man or a few," it was
expressing a wholly new concept of republican government. 30 9 Gordon
Wood describes it as the "disembodiment of government" because it sep-
arated sovereignty, the locus of ultimate political power in the society,
from government.310 The legislature represented the people for certain
purposes only, and not to all intents and purposes whatever. It had pow-
ers limited to those that the people, who always remained sovereign, had
conferred. The written constitution served as a documentation of this ad
hoc conferral of powers from people to government. This notion of pop-
ular sovereignty and the view of government that it entails was indeed, as
Bailyn suggests, the crucial issue of the Revolution. 311 Englishmen never
could conceive that the statutes of Parliament and the statutes of colonial
307. BAiLYN, supra note 10, at 201.
308. WOOD, supra note 11, at 372-89. The idea of the people as a constituent power was "dis-
tinctively American," R.R. Palmer has argued. R. R. PALMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTION 215 (1959). This idea, however, as Palmer emphasizes, developed "unclearly, gradu-
ally, and sporadically" during the Revolution. Id. at 216.
309. Proclamation of the General Court (Jan. 23, 1776), reprinted in MASSACHUSErrS, COLONY
TO COMMONWEALTH: DOCUMENTS ON THE FORMATION OF ITS CONSTITUTION, 1775-1780, at 20
(Robert J. Taylor ed., 1972).
310. WOOD, supra note 11, at 383-89.
311. BAILYN, supra note 10, at 198.
[Vol. 70:131
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss1/5
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
legislatures could be given equal application in the colonies, because they
saw sovereignty, by definition undivisible, as vesting in Parliament. The
American Revolutionaries had no problem with the idea of two legisla-
tures for one geographical area. As they saw it, the powers of govern-
ment might be divided in any manner, without destroying Hobbes'
notion of the indivisiblity of sovereignty, because sovereignty vested in
the people rather than in the government. That crucial perception, when
it became generally understood in America, would come to underlie the
federal system of government embodied in the Constitution and to help
pave the way for the development of judicial review in the early nine-
teenth century.
As the notion of sovereignty developed from a rudimentary notion of
parliamentary sovereignty, sovereignty derived from the people, to the
notion of popular sovereignty, sovereignty seated in the people, so too
developed the related concepts of law and constitutionalism. The source
of law eventually became, not merely the description of what is and has
been, but rather the measure of what ought and ought not to be. The
revolutionary achievement of the Americans in 1776 was to firmly estab-
lish that this was the direction in which the development of legal and
political theory was headed.
C. H. McIlwain has noted that "[t]he Whigs brought on the English
Revolution, but the American doctrine of 1774 [and 1776] was really a
new revolt against one of the main principles of 1688," the doctrine of
the supremacy of Parliament, the doctrine of sovereignty found in Black-
stone.312 The Americans, in breaking from the British Empire, could
carry Whig doctrines several steps farther by establishing forms of gov-
ernment through which the people could exercise "a regular and consti-
tutional method of acting by and from themselves," as James Burgh and
other English Real Whig writers had urged.1 '
Moreover, like the English radical Whig writers who inspired them,
the American Revolutionaries conceived of constitutions essentially as
power-limiting rather than power-granting devices. Achieving republi-
canism, or self-government, itself was not the end of the matter for
Americans of Jefferson's and Madison's generation; they also sought to
improve on the English model of government by following Burgh's sug-
gestion and establishing "regular and constitutional methods" for hold-
312. CHARLES H. MCILWAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE-
TATION 150, 157-160 (reprint ed. 1958).
313. 1 BURGH, supra note 222, at 6.
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ing government accountable. Accordingly, the early constitutions of the
new American states contained various devices for limiting the power of
government in all its branches, legislative as well as executive: separation
of powers, checks and balances, the enumeration of powers, the reserva-
tion of rights, and, in some states, rudimentary forms of judicial
review.314
Consent, therefore, was a necessary but not a sufficient condition of
legitimate governmental power, as understood by Americans in the Rev-
olutionary era. Equally important for measuring legitimacy was the de-
gree to which government remained faithful to its essential ends, as
measured by the effect of governmental power upon the rights of individ-
uals. As the Declaration of Independence so explicitly and so eloquently
stated, all persons possess "certain unalienable rights," and government
was instituted "to secure these rights." From this it follows that all gov-
ernmental power-even that sanctioned by the will of the majority of the
political community-becomes illegitimate when used to subvert the es-
sential ends for which government was established, the protection of the
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That profound in-
sight, which followed from the radical Whigs' insistence on a continual
regard for the "first principles" of government, was the most important
lesson that the American Founders learned from their English radical
Whig teachers. It is a lesson that cannot be ignored by those of us who
take seriously the "original intent" of the Framers.
314. Each of these mechanisms for limiting the power of government is discussed in ADAMS,
supra note 303, passim.
Recent interest in term limitations for Congress and state legislatures has revived another radical
Whig idea, "rotation in office." Several of the earliest state constitutions set limits on reelection to
offices, particularly governorships, senatorial seats, and council seats. Advocates of rotation, citing
the authority of the radical Whigs, based their case on the corrupting influence of political power
and their distrust of professional politicians. They also believed that frequent turnover in oflicehold-
ing would bring more able individuals into public service as well as generally encourage more in-
volvement in public affairs. See generally id. at 251-53, 308-11.
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